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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the capabilities of the 300-ship Navy that could be afforded with an 
assumed fifty percent decrease in defense spending and the restrictions that this size navy would 
place on U.S. foreign policy. This navy could fulfill the nation's strategic deterrence requirements 
for the post Cold War era. The SSBN force alone provides the required EMT to provide the 
nation with an assured destruction capability. This navy could also fulfill the nation's forward 
presence requirements. However with the ability to maintain only two CVBGs forward 
deployed, the Navy would be forced to use non-traditional methods, such as new deployment 
force structures or a mix of high cost/high capability and low cost/low capability ships, to fulfill 
this role. The requirements for crisis response can be fulfilled but only at the tactical level of 
warfare. It is unlikely that this navy could even lift one division to conduct forced entry missions 
with. Even if one division was lifted, it is too small to conduct forced entry missions even at the 
low end of the operational level of warfare. This would force the U.S. to rely more heavily on 
joint and coalition warfare. Additionally, the ability of this navy to handle more than one crisis at 
a time is doubtful. Finally, this navy could fulfill the nation's reconstitution requirements if given 
the full assumed warning period (8 to 10 years) to reconstitute forces. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The end of the Cold War has resulted in major changes in the international 
and national security environments that have major implications for the U.S. 
Navy. These changes include calls for significant defense budget cuts, the 
increased importance of economics as a determinant of defense spending and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union which resulted in the absence of a clear 
tangible global threat to U.S. national interests. What has resulted from these 
changes is the formulation of a new U.S. national security strategy that focuses 
on regional contingencies, and the decision to cut U.S. defense budget/forces by 
at least 25-30%. Given this lack of a principal threat, it is likely that the defense 
budget will be driven even lower by economic necessity and scarcity. 
This fundamental change, as enunciated in the National Security Strategy of 
the United States and the National Milita y Strategy, requires a comprehensive 
reexamination of service strategies and programming. This examination is well 
underway as each service struggles to determine its contribution in the post-Cold 
War world. What has yet to be determined is the exact amount which will be cut 
from the U.S. defense budget and what restrictions these cuts will place on U.S. 
foreign policy. This paper attempted to address objectively the capabilities of the 
300-ship Navy that could be afforded with an assumed fifty percent decrease in 
defense spending and the restrictions that this size navy would place on U.S. 
foreign policy. 
The 300-ship Navy's ability to fulfill this role is significantly less than the 
Bush Administration's Base Force. Due to the fact that the 300-ship Navy could 
only maintain two CVBGs available for forward presence and rapid crisis 
response, the Navy could no longer use the traditional methods it has used to 
fulfill this role. 
The 300-ship Navy provides significantly reduced crisis response capability 
when compared to the Base Force. Due to fewer ships in the 300-ship Navy, and 
without a change in current employment policies, the Navy would have fewer 
ships on station and more often no CVBG in theater to respond to a crisis. This 
will result in a significant reduction in naval forces which the National 
Command Authority could use to react to ambiguous warning in the early stages 
of a crisis. A timely show of force during this stage could stabilize the situation 
and permit diplomacy to prevail. With no naval expeditionary forces in the crisis 
area the risk versus gain calculus of potential adversaries is simplified and could 
cause them to undertake action counter to U.S. interest. 
Furthermore, fewer ships would be in a state of readiness to quickly deploy 
to the crisis, resulting in significant delays in the arrival of additional CVBGs 
deployed from U.S. bases. These delays in the arrival of initial forces could 
translate into critical delays in the arrival of heavy ground and air units. 
Additionally, this increased response time could cause the crisis to develop into a 
situation requiring deployment of a larger number of U.S. forces. 
The smaller size of the amphibious forces under the 300-ship Navy will also 
have an adverse effect on the nation's ability to conduct forced entry missions. It 
is unlikely that the Navy/Marine Corps team could even get one division lifted 
m 
to conduct forced entry missions. Even if one MEF was lifted, it is too small to 
conduct forced entry missions even at the low end of the operational level of 
warfare. The 300-ship Navy would limit future amphibious operations to 
"Grenada" size operations. Even this size of operation would require longer 
planning/slower response time due to the smaller number of forward deployed 
amphibious ships. 
Under the 300-ship Navy, the nation's ability to respond unilaterally, at the 
operational level of warfare, when American interests are threatened is 
questionable. The United StatesL would only be able to project power 
conventionally at the tactical level of warfare. Therefore, the United States 
would be forced to rely more heavily on joint and coalition warfare to 
accomplish its objectives. 
The strategic situation that the United States faces in the near future will be 
fundamentally different from the one it faced during the Cold War and even the 
one it faces today. If the United States and Russia continue to follow through on 
their agreements to reduce the size of their strategic nuclear forces, then at some 
point the United States will be forced to shift to an assured destruction strategy. 
The level of destruction required to fulfill the United States' assured 
destruction capability, which was determined by the Secretary of Defense and 
accepted by the President and Congress, is 400 EMT. Very conservative 
calculations of the EMT on patrol under the 300-ship Navy show that the SSBN 
force could deliver 522 EMT and still maintain a sizable strategic reserve 
capability. Therefore, the 300-ship Navy's SSBN force appears to meet the 
nation's assured destruction capability requirements for the post Cold War era. 
Additionally, it demonstrates that the SSBN force alone is all that is needed if the 
nation shifts from a countervailing strategy to an assured destruction strategy. 
Additionally, the 300-ship Navy would not be able to fulfill its required 
reconstitution roles. Instead the United States would be forced to rely more 
heavily on its strategic nuclear forces to deter the attack of a REGT. 
Major changes in our national policy have occurred in the last three years. 
This has changed the required roles and missions the Navy must fulfill. The 
Navy must recognize these changes and plan accordingly. A consensus of 
opinion, based on merit, must be reached by the Navy's leadership about what 
course the Navy will steer in the future. Additional defense budget cuts are 
going to occur, and if the Navy continues to use bureaucratic compromise to 




Although Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait received most of the 
news coverage on August 2, 1990, another event which arguably will have 
much greater historical significant also occurred that day. This event was 
President Bush's speech at the Aspen Institute which described the new 
national security strategy for the United states.1 Bush's plan laid out new 
national objectives; and called for a drastic restructuring of the U.S. military 
establishment and defense policy. 
This new defense agenda calls for recasting U.S. defenses around four major principles: 
deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The first three of these 
sound familiar. However, beneath the superficial similarity to past U.S. principles, 
important differences exist. The strategy calls for maintaining a much smaller active and 
reserve force mix primarily focused on presence and world-wide major contingency 
operations -- not a Europe-centered global war with the USSR. If forces were required to 
fight a major war against the Soviet Union, the United States assumes that there would be 
sufficient time to reconstitute them. This shift from a focus on the "worst case" threat to 
the "most likely" case will have major programming and strategy implications in both the 
near term and the long run.2 
There are three important assumptions behind this new strategy. First, 
that the military threat from the former Soviet Union has been significantly 
reduced. This allows the United States to have eight to ten years of warning 
prior to a resurgent/emergent global threat (REGT) once again threatens to 
launch a major conventional offensive into Europe. Second, NATO will still 
l f '~emarks  by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium (as delivered), Office of the 
Press Secretary (Aspen, CO), the White House, August 2,1990,6 . 
2 ~ e e  James J. Tritten, "The New National Security Strategy and Base Force," in 
Reconstituting Nu tional Defense: The New U. 5. Na tionnl Security Strategy, Tritten, J. J. and 
Stockton, P.N., eds. (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 9. 
exist. This is tied into the new strategy's concept of reconstitution.3 Lastly, 
that the total resources devoted to defense can be reduced by at least 25-30 
percent from fiscal years 1991-1994.4 
The Bush Administration's proposed force structure is termed the Base 
Force by the Department of Defense (DOD). Under the Base Force, the 
recommended force level for the Navy fell from a goal of 600 ships (545 actual 
ships) to approximately 448 ships. This included 12 deployable aircraft carries 
and 1 devoted to training, 13 carrier airwings (CVWs), 150 surface combatants 
with no battleships, a 2-1/2 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Marine Corps 
of around 159,000 personnel with simultaneous amphibious lift for the 
assault echelons of 2-1 /2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBS).~ 
Since the Base Force originally was in part based on the existence of a 
Soviet threat, the Soviet Union's failed coup, which occurred in August 1991, 
and its subsequent dissolution combined with domestic economic difficulties 
have caused many individuals, including newly elected Bill Clinton, to call 
3 ~ e e  James J. Tritten, Our New National Seclrrity Strategy: America Promises to Come Back 
(Westport, CT and London: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 17-18. "Reconstitution is not the same 
thing as mobilization or regeneration-- it is more like what the United Kingdom had planned 
during the interwar years, when it assumed that up to ten years of strategic warning would be 
available. New defense rnanufach~ring capability and new forces and military would be built 
from the ground up." 
4 ~ o r  detailed examination of the New National Security Strategy see: James J. Tritten 
"America Promises to Come Back: The President's New National Security Strategy," Security 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1991, p.173-234; Tritten's "The New National Security Strategy 
and Base Force," in Reconstituting Na tional Defense: The New U .  S. Na tional Strategy; 
Tritten's Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back; and President 
George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C. : GPO, 
August 1991). 
S~ritten's T h e  New National Security Strategy and Base Force," in Reconstituting 
National Defense: The New U.S. National Security, 16. 
for more drastic cuts in defense spending.6 President Bush made some 
concessions in his 1992 State of the Union address by agreeing to a 30 percent 
cut in defense spending (i.e., an additional $50 billion spread out over 5 years), 
but he warned, "This far and no further." Many individuals were still not 
satisfied. The other two presidential candidates proposed additional cuts on 
the order of $40 to $60 billion, and some in Congress have proposed 
additional cuts on the order of $150 to $200 billion.7 The recent election of 
Bill Clinton will result in America's military becoming even smaller and less 
expensive. The real questions are how much smaller will the military 
become, and how much will the defense budget be cut by?8 
Under this emerging national security strategy, what roles and missions is 
the Navy required to fulfill? What impact will additional defense cuts have 
on the Navy's ability to fulfill these roles and missions? What size of Navy 
6 ~ o r  detailed examination of the debate see: P. Towell, and G. Hager, "Soviet Union's 
Disintegration Spurs Call for Defense Cuts," Congressional Quarterly, September 14, 1991, 2631- 
4; P. Towell, "Defense Spending Bill to Test B-2 Bomber," Congressional Quarterly, September 
21,1991,2703-4; E.A. Palmer, "Defense Budget Wins Approval; Clouds on '93 Horizon," 
Congressional Quarterly, November 23, 1991,3468-9; D.S. Cloud, "Bush Talks of Defense Cuts, 
Loosening Budget Pact," Congressional Quarterly, January 4, 1992, 15; P. Towell, "The Defense 
Budget: A Preemptive Strike?'Congressional Qunrterly, January 18, 1992, 103; and G. Hager, 
"Budget Drama, Act 11: Scenarios for Chaos," Congressional Quarterly, January 25, 1992, 156-9. 
7 ~ o r  detailed examination of the debate see: P. Tyler, ''Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to 
Fight in Post-Cold War Era," New York Times, February 17,1992; P. Tyler, "Aspin Asks More 
Cuts in Military," New York Times, February 23, 1992; Representative Les Aspin, An Approach 
to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options 
(Washington, D.C. : U.S. Congress, February 25, 1992); R. Maze, "Democrats Target 200,000 
More Jobs," Navy Times, March 9, 1992; R. Maze, "Cheney: Firing 300,000 'Ain't Painless."' 
Navy Times, March 16, 1992; S. Dentzer, "Ross Perot's Bitter Tonic," U.S. News and World 
Report, August 3, 1992,4549; S. Daggett, and R. Goldich, "Defense Policy: Threats, Force 
Structure, and Budget Issues," CRS Issue Brief, August 25,1992,14; and W. Matthews, and T. 
Philpott, "Bush vs. Clinton," Navy Times, October 5,1992. 
8 ~ .  Auster, "Fighting Tomorrow's Wars," U.S. News and World Report, November 16, 1992, 
77-78. 
would the nation have? What types of ships should the Navy have? Is it 
time for the Navy to rethink its Cold War procurement and deployment 
practices? The purpose of this paper is to discuss these and related questions 
in order to assist in determining future roles, missions, and force structure for 
the U.S. Navy. It is recognized that in this era of joint operations the 
capability of one of the branches of the Armed Services complements, 
enhances and enables the capabilities of the others. This paper does not 
attempt to prove the superiority of one branch over the other, but rather 
- 
looks at the future of the Navy. 
Strategic planning starts with an analysis of either the threat, the goals, or 
the available resources. In the United States, war planning generally starts 
with the threat (or goals). While program planning officially starts with the 
threat, it usually, really starts with available resources. The Bush 
Administration attempted to guide the current defense budget debate by 
developing a new U.S. national security strategy that was budget driven. 
Thus, the budget now drives strategy (goals) which drives force structure 
which drives threat scenarios. "Breaking the budget's stranglehold on 
strategy will be extraordinarily difficult without the rallying point of a 
principal threat and may perhaps be impossible given the likelihood, indeed 
the certainty, that the defense budget will be driven even lower by economic - 
necessity and scarcity. 
Second, without clear, crisp, and enforceable strategic direction and policy 
objectives, the cumulative effect of the budget cuts, if the past is any guide, 
will be to exacerbate and magnify the diminution in aggregate military 
capability.9 
Although predicting what future defense spending will be may be 
impossible, a study which examines the capability that the nation will have at 
a given level of defense spending could provide some of the missing 
ingredients to our nation's current debate over defense spending by revealing 
the restrictions these spending cuts will place on U.S. foreign policy. 
Additionally, it may help ensure the most efficient spending of limited 
defense resources. 
This paper will start with an assumption about the amount of resources 
which will be made available for defense spending in the future. An analysis 
of roles and missions for the Navy under a new strategy will then be 
conducted. Due to the fact that, in many ways, the historical analogy for 
today's strategic environment is the 1920s, this analysis will also include an 
historical examination of the role the Navy has played in fulfilling the 
nation's policies.10 The purpose is to look for examples that the Navy can 
follow in these tough budget times. 
A probable force structure will then be offered that can be afforded under 
the assumed defense spending. An examination of this force structure will be 
conducted to determine which roles and missions cannot be fulfilled.11 The 
9 ~ a r l a n  K. Ulman, In Harm's Way: American Sea Power and the 2lst Century, (Silver 
Springs, MD: Bartelby Press, 1991), 149. 
losee National Security Strategy for the United States, 3; and Ulrnan, 10-14. 
l h e f  of Naval Operations, ADM. Frank B. Kelso, I1 testified before Congress, on March 
11, 1992, that additional budget cuts would result in the Navy not being able to fulfill all of its 
assigned roles and missions. U.S. Congress, House, Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee 
on Defense, "FY-93 Navy Budget," Committee Hearing, 102th Cong., 2nd Session, 199561-2. 
purpose of this is to relate decreases in defense spending to decreases in the 
capability of the Navy. 
It is realized that this paper cannot describe every possible alternative 
force structure, but it can contribute to meaningful discussion about the 
future of the U.S. Navy. This paper will take a macroscopic look at the 
problem. The critical assumption this paper makes deals with training and 
readiness. It is assumed that the DOD will not repeat the mistakes of the post- 
Vietnam build-down which resulted in a "hollow" U.S. military force with a 
significantly reduced war fighting capability. 
11. FUTURE DEFENSE SPENDING ASSUMPTION 
The first order of business is to look at the proposed levels of future 
defense spending. The Bush Administration's request for fiscal years (FY) 
1992 through 1997 is seen as the best possible case for future defense spending. 
The next step is to assume a future level of defense spending. This 
assumption will be used for the analysis of the Navy throughout the rest of 
this paper. This assumption is not intended to be a prediction of what the 
outcome of the current battle over the defense spending will be, but rather to 
show how dramatically the roles and missions which the Navy can fulfill 
will change with each additional decrease in defense spending. 
Table 1 shows the DOD budget authority for N 1992 through 1997. In one 
year's time the Bush Administration has decreased requested defense 
spending by $63.8 billion ($50.4 billion in program cuts, and another $13.4 
billion that was a result of adjustments in the baseline for inflation) for this 
period. The final row is this paper's assumed level of defense spending for 
the same period. This level assumes an additional $175 billion decrease in 
defense spending over the period FY 1993 through 1997. 
Although percentages can be misleading depending upon the baseline 
figures used, this assumed budget calls for about double the cuts originally 
agreed upon under the Budged Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990. For FY 1991, 
the first year under the BEA, defense was cut eight percent below the baseline, 
which was the previous year's level plus inflation. If defense spending was 
funded through 1995 at levels proposed under the BEA, defense spending 
would fall $235 billion below the baseline.12 This original $235 billion 
decrease in spending was termed a 25 percent cut in defense spending, 
therefore for consistency this paper's assumed budget will be called the "50 
percent decrease" budget. 
TABLE 1. DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY ($ BILLIONS) 
CUM 
1992mmm1996199792-97 
President's FY 1991 Budget 278.3 277.9 278.7 280.7 2826 287.4 
Adjusted Summit Level 277.5 275.6 275.8 278.3 279.9 284.6 -13.4 
Program Adjustments 
(Rescissions/ Supplemental) 6.6 -8.0 -8.0 -8.4 -9.5 -10.0 -50.4 
President's FY 1993 DOD Budget 270.9* 267.6 267.8 269.9 270.4 247.6 -63.8 
Additional Decrease -20.0 -30.0 -40.0 -40.0 -45.0 -175.0 
50% Decrease DOD Budget 270.9* 247.6 237.8 229.9 230.4 229.6 -238.8 
*Excludes the cost of Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
Source: Secretary of Defense briefing charts used during W D  Budget Briefing January 29, 
1992. The 50% Decrease DOD Budget is provided by the author. 
Table 2 shows DOD budget authority in constant FY 1993 $ billion. These 
figures are needed in order to make meaningful projections about future 
defense spending. Note that the "50 percent decrease" budget will result in a 
cumulative 47.1 percent real decline in defense spending since 1985. 
12see R. Doyle and J. McCaffery, "Defense and Budget Enforcement Act of 1990:. 
(unpublished paper). 
TABLE 2. DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY (FY 1993 CONSTANT $ BILLIONS) 
~ 1 ~ ~ ~ l e P z  
Summit Level 277.9 268.0 260.5 252.8 248.7 
% Real Decline -3.7 -3.6 -2.8 -3.0 -1.6 
President's FY 1993 DOD Budget 267.6 258.0 250.4 241.8 237.5 
% Real Decline -7.0* -3.6 -2.9 -3.4 -1.8 
Cumulative % Real Decline since 1985 -28.8 -31.3 -33.3 -35.6 -36.7 
50% Decrease DOD Budget 247.6 229.1 213.3 206.0 198.6 
% Real Decline -13.5* -7.5 -6.9 -3.4 -3.6 
Cumulative % Real Decline since 1985 -34.0 -38.9 -43.2 -45.1 -47.1 
*From Enacted level excluding cost of Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
Source: Secretary of Defense briefing charts used during DOD Budget Briefing January 29, 
1992. The 50% Decrease DOD Budget is provided by the author. 
Unless a crisis or an "identifiable" threat emerges, political or economic 
pressures will continue to drive down defense spending. The only question 
is how much. To get an idea of what defense spending might be like at the 
turn of the century the "50 percent decrease" budget must be projected into 
the future. Table 3 gives an example of what DOD budget authority might be 
through FY 2005. Four scenarios are provided to cover a range of possible 
futures for defense spending. This results in a worse case scenario of a $143.5 
billion defense budget by FY 2005. 
TABLE 3, PROJECTED GROWTH IN DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY (FY 1993 
CONSTANT $ BILLIONS) 
l e e z ~ l e e f 2 B m z u m t u m z z Q ! B v r r r a u m s  
Scenario 1 
(+2%growth) 198.6 202.6 206.7 210.8 215.0 219.3 223.7 228.2 232.8 
Scenario 2 
(nogrowth) 198.6 198.6 198.6 198.6 198.6 198.6 198.6 198.6 198.6 
Scenario 3 
(-2Xgrowth) 198.6 194.6 190.7 186.9 183.2 179.5 175.9 172.4 169.0 
Scenario 4 
(-4%growth) 198.6 190.7 183.2 175.9 169.0 162.2 155.7 149.5 143.5 
Source: The author 
The next step is to determine how much of this future defense spending 
will be spent on the Navy. Table 4 shows the percentage of the total DOD 
budget authority that each service received during the period N 1990 through 
1993. (Note FY 1993 data is based on the Bush Administration's proposed 
budget.) The Navy received 32.9 percent, which is consistent with its post 
World War 11 historical a ~ e r a ~ e . 1 3  
l3~ee  Donald C. Daniel, "Beyond the 400-Ship Navy," Adelphi Paper 261, (London: 
Brassey's for the International Institute of Strategic Studies), 6-8. 
TABLE 4. DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY BY SERVICE ($ BILLIONS)* 
1990 
Army 77.9 (26.8%) 
Navy 99.5 
(34.2%) 





Defense Wide 2.9 
(1 .O%) 
Grand Total 291.0 
*Excludes cost of Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
Source: Secretary of Defense briefing charts used during DOD Budget Briefing January 29, 
1992. Percentage figures added by the author. 
The final step is to determine the probable Department of the Navy 
(DON) budget authority under the "50 percent decrease" budget Using 
possible future levels of budget authority from Tables 2 and 3, and possible 
Navy shows of 30, 33 (today's share), 40, and 50 percent, Table 5 shows the 
fiscal consequences for the Navy. 
TABLE 5. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY BUDGET AUTHORITY (FY 1993 
CONSTANT $ BILLIONS) 
DON Share 
(p-U 
50'y0 Decrease Budget for Possible Future 
FY 1993;1997 Range 
24Zhmw2Qda14&6 us 
30 74 69 64 62 60 56 44 
33 82 75 70 68 65 61 48 
40 99 92 85 82 79 74 58 
50 124 115 107 103 99 93 73 
Source: Data is from the author's tables. Format for this table is Harlan K. Ulman, In 
Harm's Way: American Seapower and the 21st Century, 157. 
For the near term (through FY 1997), the DON budget authority, under 
the "50 percent decrease" budget, is most likely to be in the $60 to $80 billion 
range. In the longer term (through FY 2005), the DON budget could decrease 
to the $45 to $55 billion level depending upon the economy and the 
emergence of a perceived threat. 
These figures will be used later to show the size and makeup of the Navy 
that the nation can afford in the future. It should be noted that it would be 
wrong to create the impression that there is a specific formula that relates 
budgets and force structure. There is no formula that can do this. A very 
large navy can be built for "little" money if the ships are small, inexpensive, 
and of low capability, or if training and readiness are sacrificed. Conversely, a 
small high quality navy could have a "big" price tag. As stated earlier, this 
paper assumes the Navy will not sacrifice training and readiness. Therefore, 
it is possible to make some cost versus force size/capability comparisons. 
111. HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN 
FULFILLING NATIONAL POLICY 
Since the present can seldom be properly understood except in light of the 
past, significant elements of our national policy and the Navy's role in 
support of that policy are traced from the American Revolution down to the 
present. It should be noted that a number of major changes in our national 
policy have occurred since 1775 and that the Navy's role has changed 
accordingly. 
U.S. policy and its related national objectives have gone through three 
major stages and is arguably entering its fourth stage. In the first stage (1775- 
1890), the driving force was the desire to complete the internal consolidation 
of the United States as a nation. During this period the nation increased its 
importance in the Western Hemisphere. The Navy performed admirably but 
was far from being a major force in the world. Additionally, the Navy did not 
play a dominant role in the nation's policy due to the policy's related 
objectives. The size varied throughout the period, but was usually extremely 
small unless a conflict gave the nation a reason to build new ships. 
In the second stage (1890-1945), the United States emerged as a world 
power. American policy fluctuated between a desire to project American 
power and influence, and a desire to avoid international responsibilities. One 
of the driving forces behind the nation's new national policy and subsequent 
rise in the importance of the Navy was Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
According to Mahan, expanding foreign commerce was essential to 
national power and prosperity. To compete successfully a nation must have 
a strong merchant marine. These vessels required secure ports at their 
destinations and protection throughout their voyages. Therefore, a nation 
needed to have overseas colonies, and a powerful Navy. Such a navy was 
also necessary to defend the colonies, and the colonies, in turn, provided 
bases to support overseas operations. 
Mahan stressed the need for a navy capable of engaging in offensive 
naval warfare in order to support defense in the political sense. A navy 
capable of only defensive military action would leave "the enemy at ease as 
regards his own interests, and at liberty to choose his own time and manner 
of fighting." Additionally, Mahan believed a strong Navy would provide a 
"shield of defensive power" behind which America could mobilize in time of 
war. 
The United States gradually began to follow Mahan's advice and build up 
its naval forces. Finally with the Naval Act of 1916, Congress authorized the 
building of a "Navy second to none." After World War I new construction 
virtually stopped until the mid 1930s. During the interwar period the Navy 
was used in its role of a "shield of defensive power"; acting as the country's 
first line of defense. Smaller less capable ships were deployed in small 
numbers throughout the world; but the majority of the ships were kept in 
one fleet, which was shifted between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in order 
to achieve Mahan's principle of "concentration of forces." 
Despite the fall off in new construction and the Japanese surprise attack 
on Pearl Harbor, the Navy entered World War I1 much better prepared for 
combat than it ever had in the past. A solid base of the fleet that would be 
used in the war already existed, and the additional ships which would be 
needed were at least in the blueprint state by 1941.14 
In the third stage (1945-1990), the United States accepted a peacetime 
position of world leadership and was determined to stop the spread of 
communism and to deter Soviet aggression. This was characterized by our 
support of the United Nations (UN), and various bilateral and multilateral 
collective security agreements throughout the world. Additionally, a new 
strategy of deterrence through nuclear weapons emerged. 
The Navy's role during this period went through many changes. 
Initially, after World War 11, the Navy's concern centered on antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) and nuclear strike warfare. During the later 1950s and 1960s 
the focus shifted toward limited war and deterrence through nuclear powered 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). In the early 1970s, the Navy formally 
stated its four missions -- strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, 
and peacetime presence. Sea control was discussed as the dominant role 
throughout most of the 1970s. In the late 1970s, the focus shifted to flexible 
offensive forward global power protection, with a wide range of options, 
against the Soviet Union and its attacking forces. This was later refined into 
"the Maritime Strategy" which justified the massive naval build-up of the 
1980s. Throughout this period, Mahan's justifications for a strong Navy took 
1 4 ~ o r  more detailed discussion on the Navy and its relationship to national policy during 
the first two stages see: L.K. Pomeroy, "The Navy and National Policy," US. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, April 1960, 90-97; and P.A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," 
in Makers of Modern Sfrntegy, Paret, P., ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1986), 
444-479. 
a back seat to the Soviet "threat" and the Navy's attempt to win the Cold 
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The third stage of U.S. policy and its related national objectives ended 
over a period of three years (1989-1991). During this period the Berlin Wall 
fell; the Warsaw Pact dissolved; Germany reunified; democracy took hold in 
Eastern Europe; a U.N. sponsored international coalition successfully defeated 
Iraq; and the Soviet Union dissolved as communism collapsed as an ideology 
and way of life. In response to these changes and the country's economic 
difficulties discussed earlier, the United States is in the process of making 
drastic changes to its polices and objectives.16 
In this fourth stage, the United States is now the lone superpower in the 
world and is looked upon as a stabilizing force throughout most of the world. 
The threat has vaguely been categorized as "the unknown and the 
uncertain."l7 "The national interests and objectives include: 
* The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, 
with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. 
The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies to: 
-Deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the 
United States and its allies and -- should deterrence fail -- repel or defeat 
l5see J.D. Watkins, '*The Maritime Strategyo'; J. Lehman, "The 600-Ship Navy1*; and P.M. 
1 
Swartz, "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography." U.S. Naval lnstitute 
Proceedings, January 1986,l-47; and CAPT. Peter M. Swartz, USN, and Jan S. Breemer, 
Bibliographers, with James J. Tritten, Principal Investigator, "The Maritime Strategy Debates: 
A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic in the 1980s" ( Naval Postgraduate School, 
September 30,1989). 
16see General Colin Powell, National Military Strategy 1992, ( Washington D.C: GPO, 
January 1992); and National Security Strntegj of the United States, . 
17see National Military Strategy 1992, 3-4. 
military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its 
interests and its allies. 
-Effectively counter threats to the security of the United States 
and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of 
international terrorism. 
-Improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms 
control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems 
capable of defending against limited ballistic missile strikes, and enhancing 
appropriate conventional capabilities. 
-Foster restraint in global military spending and discourage 
military adventurism. 
-Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by 
encouraging reduction in foreign production, combating international 
traffickers and reducing demand at home. 
* A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for 
individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and 
abroad. 
-Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the 
oceans, and space. 
* Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies 
and friendly nations. 
-Strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that 
share a commitment to democracy and individual rights. 
-Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to 
make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, 
economic, and social progress. 
* A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, 
human rights, and democratic institutions flourish. 
-Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers 
that might seek regional dominance. 
-Aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from 
aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug 
trafficking."18 
In many ways, the nation's new policy is similar to its policy during the 
latter portion of the second stage (post World War I to the mid-1930s). There 
is a desire to project American power and influence, but there is also a desire 
to avoid international responsibilities (now termed "not of vital interest").l9 
Although the nation does not possess colonies or a strong merchant marine, 
it is still dependent on overseas markets, and requires a strong navy to protect 
shipping. The Navy and other military forces need to be capable of engaging 
-- 
18see National Military Strategy 1992, 5 .  
1 9 ~ h e  United States has never possessed the ability to project conventional power at the 
strategic level of warfare. Under the Bush Administration's proposed new strategy the United 
States will only be able to project conventional power at the tactical level of warfare. 
Coalition style war fighting will be needed to project power at the operational level of 
warfare. For more details on the levels of warfare see, James J. Tritten, "Address to the 
Submarine Technology Symposium, 12 May 1992," The Submarine RPuiew, July 1992,19, "The 
strategic level of warfare is a global war fought generally between coalitions. The operational 
level of warfare is a major campaip; such as Desert Storm, Vietnam, or Korea. The tactical 
level of warfare is the Panarna/Grenada invasions, or something less, and does not necessarily 
involve all the armed services and combat arms." 
in offensive and defensive warfare to provide a "shield of defensive power" 
behind which the nation can reconstitute in time of global war. 
Similar domestic economic problems exist which will translate into 
decreased defense spending and a smaller navy. Despite the expected fall off 
in new construction, the research and design (R and D) phase of the new 
strategy should ensure additional ships and aircrafts, which will be needed to 
fight a European-centered global war, will at least be on the drawing board at 
the start of the reconstitution. 
This means the Navy will return to its pre-Cold War emphasis of 
contributing to events ashore. So although the waters may be unfamiliar, 
they are far from uncharted. The past may hold valuable lessons as the Navy 
decides how it wants to adjust to the future. 
IV. THE NAVY'S ROLES AND MISSIONS UNDER THE NEW NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY 
Given the unpredictability of where or when future crises will occur, 
what role should the navy fulfill in support of these new national security 
objectives? The four fundamental elements of the Bush defense agenda 
(forward presence, deterrence, crisis response, and reconstitution) are used to 
develop future roles and missions for the ~ a v ~ . 2 O  
A. FORWARD PRESENCE 
In this new era of regional threats the need for forward presence has 
become more important.21 Yet defense budget cuts and the closing of many 
overseas bases have prompted the DOD to reevaluate its traditional 
definitions of forward presence in order for the nation to continue to fulfill 
its many 0bli~ations.22 The new definition of forward presence emphasizes 
the need to "show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance 
2 0 ~ h e  following discussion is summarized from the National Military Strategy 1992.69:  
National Security strategy of the United States, 25-31; Tritten's Our New National Security 
Strategy: America Promises to Come Back, 17-26; and an insert for the record to ADM Kelso's 
March 11,1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on 
Defense, 61. 
2 1 ~ e e  National Security S tm tesy of the United States, "In a world less driven by an 
immediate, massive threat to ~ u r o ~ e ' o r  the danger of global war, the need to support a smaller 
but still crucial forward presence and to deal with regional contingencies ... will shape how we 
organize, equip, train, deploy and employ our forces." 25. 
2 2 ~ h i s  is discussed in Trittenls, Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to 
Come Back, 25-26. 
regional stability, and provide crisis response capability while promoting U.S. 
influence and access."23 
The planned reduction of forward land-based U.S. forces worldwide could 
mean naval forces will be increasingly responsible for fulfilling the objectives 
of forward presence. There are six roles for the Navy under forward presence. 
The first role is peacetime engagement. This is similar to the traditional 
presence role the Navy has historically fulfilled. It is needed to counter the 
image of an American global withdrawal as force reductions occur and fewer 
forces are forward based. The forward deployment of naval forces in this role 
"provides an underpinning for diplomatic activities which, when combined 
with other U.S. foreign policy initiatives, are influential in shaping events. 
These forward operations are oriented toward diplomacy, coalition building 
and the promotion of stability which fosters peace and cooperation."24 
Additionally, this role will also guarantee the freedom of the sea which will 
facilitate trade and improve the economic conditions of the United States and 
our allies. Typical missions include: Stationed forces; rotational overseas 
deployments; access and storage agreements; port visits; military-to-military 
relations; and joint and combined training exercises.25 This role does not 
necessarily have to be fulfilled by aircraft carrier battle groups to be credible.26 
23~ational  Military Strategy 1992, 7 
24~ee insert for the record to ADM Kelw's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 2. 
25This is discussed in Tritten's Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to 
Come Back, 25-26. 
26~or  further discussions concerning naval diplomacy and credible naval presence see, 
James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 191 9-1979 (London: The MacMillian Press, 1981); Edward N. 
Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
The second role is to enhance crisis response capability. Naval forces 
provide the National Command Authority with the ability to react to 
ambiguous warning in the early stages of a crisis. This timely show of force 
can stabilize the situation and permit diplomacy to prevail. By complicating 
the risk versus gain calculus of potential adversaries, we cause them to 
consider carefully the initiation of activity which might be counter to U.S. 
interests. Depending upon the crisis, forward deployed naval expeditionary 
forces can respond autonomously or become an enabling force about which a 
decisive joint/coalition based response can be ~ h a ~ e d . 2 7  
The third role is protecting U.S. citizens. This includes not only 
responsive and capable evacuation lift, but the ability to be able to do it in the 
midst of conflict. This could also include protection against terrorists by 
stopping vessels, suspected of containing terrorists or illegal arms shipments, 
on the high seas. 
The fourth role is combating drugs. This involves ocean surveillance of 
potential drug traffickers, interdiction of drug shipments, and intelligence 
collection for counter narcotics agencies. 
The fifth role is humanitarian assistance. This requires the ability to 
respond rapidly and effectively to disasters. As stated in the National Military 
Strategy, "Not only must our forces provide humanitarian aid, but as seen A 
* 
1974); Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Wifhout War: U.S. Amt f  Forces as a 
Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,!978); and Jan.S. Breemer, 
"Where Are the Submarines? Deterrence, Naval Presence, and the Submarine Fleet," The 
Submarine Rtwiew, October 1992, 28-37. 
27~ee insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 2. 
recently in Northern Iraq, in some cases they must also be prepared to engage 
in conflict in order to assist and project those in need."28 
The final role is intelligence collection. This requires the ability to overtly 
and covertly collect information, and then transmit real-time information to 
the National Command Authorities in time to avert or mitigate crises. This 
role is necessary under all four elements of the new defense agenda. Typical 
missions include maritime intelligence collection in support of national 
requirements; surveillance of air or naval forces that could act hostile against 
vital interests of the United States; and detection, tracking, and reporting 
vessels involved in terrorist-related activities. 
B. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE 
Nuclear and conventional deterrence costs less than any level of conflict, 
and is the cornerstone of U.S. military strategy. As long as any nation 
possesses the nuclear weapons capability to attack the United States or U.S. 
forces abroad, deterrence of nuclear attack will be the highest priority. 
Conventional deterrence will rely on our ability to sustain credible forward 
presence and/or respond to crises in key regions. Deterrence is achieved by 
convincing a potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level, 
exceeds any possibility of gain.29 
28~ee The National Military Strategy 1992, 15. 
29~ee National Secuity  Strategy of the United Sta t s ,  25-27; Na tional Military Strategy 
1992, 6; H.L. Garrett, F.B. Kelso and A.M. Gray, "The Way Ahead," U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, April 1991,38-39; and Department of the Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval 
Operations (Undersea Warfare), Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond, (Washington, D.C.: 
US. Department of the Navy, January 18, 1992), 2-3. 
Under deterrence, the Navy has four roles. First, the Navy should be able 
to deter use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against 
the United States or its allies. The ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) will be 
used to fill this role during normal peacetime operations. The SSBN has long 
been recognized as the most survivable element of the nation's nuclear 
deterrence, and provides the nation with an assured second strike capability. 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) as well as the unilateral 
initiatives of the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union 
have led to real reductions in on-alert nuclear weapons by both superpowers. 
As the United States has taken its bomber force off alert and deactivated half 
of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force in preparation for 
dismantling, the sea-based leg of the strategic triad has assumed more 
responsibility.30 
President Bush put the issue of non-strategic nuclear forces on the back 
burner with his nuclear initiatives of September 27, 1991. In a crisis, if the 
President deems it necessary, these tactical nuclear weapons can be brought 
back aboard the Navy's air, surface, and subsurface units to assist in fulfilling 
this role.31 The ability to fulfill this role depends upon the Navy 
maintaining its tactical nuclear weapons' administration, qualification and 
training programs. If these programs are cut to save money, then this 
capability will have to be reconstituted. 
-- 
30~or further details, see Department of Defense, "Department of Defense News Briefing 
with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Pete Williams, 
ASD (Public Affairs) Saturday, September 28, 1991," which followed the President's nuclear 
initiative address on national television. 
31~bid. 
Second, the Navy should be able to hold an adversary's nuclear weapons 
or other weapons of mass destruction at risk. By holding these weapons at 
risk, additional uncertainty with respect to the viability of these weapons is 
created in a potential enemy's mind. Attack submarines and maritime patrol 
aircraft are the most effective way of hold threat SSBNs at risk. Russia is 
likely to continue to decrease its strategic warhead inventory. Their past 
preference has been toward land based ballistic missiles. Therefore, in the 
future the number of SSBNs that the United States needs to hold at risk may 
decrease or this role may even be eliminated. This possible decreased 
emphasis toward strategic ASW could free up attack submarines and 
maritime patrol aircraft for other roles. 
Carrier battle groups and cruise missile capable surface ships and 
submarines are capable of fulfilling this mission against Third World nations 
with a relatively small number of these weapons. The Navy may also fulfill 
this role by way of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM)/GPALS capable platform. 
In the near future this seems unlikely due to the cost of this type of system. 
Political impediments must also be removed to allow the deployment of an 
ABM system. Until a land based system is deployed, it is unlikely that a sea 
based system will be developed. 
Third, the Navy should be able to deter the use of conventional weapons 
against the United States or its allies. A quick reaction capability and the 
demonstrated willingness to use force in defense of vital interests act as 
significant deterrents to escalation of conventional crises.32 The Navy 
3 2 ~ e e  insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 4. 
possesses a full range of options including the carrier battle group with its 
imposing physical presence; the surface action group with its capability to fire 
hundreds of precision cruise missiles; and attack submarines, acting alone or 
in groups, with their capability to deny use of the seas or conduct precision 
strikes ashore. All these options have the ability to cripple vital elements of 
an aggressor's military and economic infrastructure, and the capability for 
sustained combat without requirements for forward basing. Additionally, 
,b 
this role can be fulfilled without risking negative foreign domestic opinion by 
b 
having to place our forces within another country's borders. Overall, the 
availability of credible and sustainable naval forces provides the United States 
with many options, including diplomatic leverage to dissuade a regional 
aggressor. 
Fourth, the Navy should be used to provide an insurance policy with 
respect to a REGT. This means retaining the capability to defeat or neutralize 
the Russian military in conflict. This would enable the nation to "hedge our 
bet" in case Russia dissolves into an authoritarian type of regime, or some 
other scenario developed that required the United States to rely on this 
insurance policy. This would also provide the United States with leverage to 
ensure Russia continues to decrease the size of its military. 
i 
C CRISIS RESPONSE 
Threats less than that of a global war, in the past assumed to be handled 
by forces procured to fight the former Soviet Union, now occupy the majority 
of programming war fighting contingencies. The 1991 Joint Military Net 
Assessment (JMNA) proposed a series of conventional conflict scenarios. 
These threats range from generic counterinsurgency (COIN)/narcotic 
operations, to lesser regional contingencies (LRC), to major regional 
contingencies (MRC). An MRC might, if not properly handled, escalate into a 
regional war. Regional war is not viewed as a smaller version of the old 
global war.33 
The LRC threat scenarios are at the tactical level of warfare. The MRC 
threat scenarios are at the operational level of warfare, not at the strategic 
level of war.34 
The end of the Cold War may result in increased regional conflicts fueled 
by ethnic, cultural or economic differences, or control of resources. The range 
and scope of such contingencies can be many and varied. However, when 
U.S. interests are threatened, the goal will be constant -- where possible 
prevent conflict in consonance with U.S. national security objective. 
American forces must be able to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to 
fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort with other nations.35 
Naval crisis response goals have been described as using peacetime 
presence forces to respond to a crisis area within seven days. Forward 
deployed and surge forces are expected to combine into Expeditionary Strike 
33~ee James J. Tritten, "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 12 May 1992," 
The Submarine Reuiew, July 1992, 17-20. 
341bid., 19. "The strategic level of warfare is a global war fought generally between 
coalitions. The operational level of warfare is a major campaign; such as Desert Storm, 
Vietnam, or Korea. The tactical level of warfare is the Panama/Grenada invasions, or 
something less, and does not necessarily involve all the armed services and combat arms." 
3 5 ~ e e  National Security Strategy of the United States, 28-29; National Military Strategy 
1992,7; Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond, 2-3; and "The Way Ahead," US. Naval 
lnstitute Proceedings, April 1991, 38-39. 
Fleets within thirty days. If the crisis is not contained by these efforts, the 
combined air, land, and sea forces would be organized within sixty days.36 
Under crisis response the Navy has three roles. First, the Navy should be 
able to conduct regional sea denial. This could range from enforcing blockade 
restrictions imposed on specified adversaries up to establishing local sea 
superiority during a conflict. This could require a full range of capabilities 
including: anti-surface warfare (ASUW); anti-submarine warfare (ASW); 
anti-air warfare (AAW); mine warfare/counter measures; strike warfare; 
special warfare; and intelligence collection. 
Second, the Navy should be able to conduct precision strikes in order to 
project power ashore. Traditionally this role has been fulfilled by aircraft 
from the carrier battle group (CVBG). The proven success of the Tomahawk 
land attack missile (TLAM) during Dessert Storm allows many naval 
platforms to credibly contribute to this role.37 The use of cruise missiles also 
decreases the risk of American casualties, and therefore decreases the 
likelihood of negative pub1 ic opinion affecting the outcome of the conflict. 
Between the two options the Navy is capable of striking over 75 percent of the 
earth's land mass.38 Additionally, both options have the capability to remain 
within weapon's range of the target for sustained periods of time. 
Third, the Navy should be able to provide ground warfare support. This 
role may overlap with the precision strike role, with aircraft and TLAMs 
3 6 ~ e e  Tritteds "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 12 May 1992." 21; and 
Department of the Navy ... From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century 
(Washington D.C.: US. Department of the Navy, 30 September 1992) 
3 7 ~ e e  ... From The Sea, Preparing the Navnl Service for the 2 l s t  Century. 
38~ee  Submarine Roles in the 1990s nnd Beyond, 15-16. 
supporting joint or combined ground operations. Other missions include: 
amphibious warfare operations; maritime strategic lift; special warfare 
operations; coastal reconnaissance; and intelligence collection. 
D. RECONSTITUTION 
A fundamental concept in the Bush Administration's new strategy is that 
there will be sufficient warning prior to a European-centered global war to 
allow the United States to reconstitute its forces in adequate time to counter 
that threat or any REGT. Reconstitution is the generation of new forces to 
meet contingencies that require forces beyond those available from active and 
reserve components. Implicit in this concept are the assumptions that any 
military threat beyond regional crisis will also have to be built or 
reconstituted.39 
Under reconstitution, the Navy has four roles. First, the Navy should 
provide a "defensive shield1' behind which the nation can reconstitute its 
forces in time of war. Due to the United States' geographical location and 
size, a strong navy can credibly hold off any large scale conventional attack. 
This should enable America to have the necessary time to rebuild the 
equipment necessary to achieve victory in a global war. In order to fulfill this 
role the Navy will require a core of modern, capable forces, plus a ready 
reserve. 
Second, the Navy should be able to guarantee the freedom of the seas for 
our nation and its allies. The U.S. military's reliance on foreign parts and 
39~ee  National Security Strategy of the United States, 28-29; National Military Strategy 
1992,7; Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond, 2-3; and "The Way Ahead," US. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, April 1991, 38-39. 
resources is likely to increase as the United States cuts its defense budget. By 
guaranteeing the freedom of the seas, the United States will be able to ensure 
it receives the resources necessary to reconstitute its military. ~dditionally, it 
will enable the United States to ensure joint/coalition equipment and forces 
can be lifted by sea to fight and defeat a REGT. 
Thirdly, The Navy should maintain a credible naval shipbuilding 
capability. The maintenance of this nation's naval shipbuilding capability is 
included in the concept of reconstitution. This role involves deterring the 
emergence of a competing naval power through the maintenance of a 
credible naval shipbuilding capability. This capability could be used to 
reconstitute forces when called upon. 
The final role is maintenance of naval superiority. This role involves 
deterring the emergence of a competing naval power through the 
maintenance of superior naval forces, and thus make it too costly for any 
potential adversary to consider building credible naval force. Additionally, 
this should provide sufficient warning time for the United States if a REGT 
attempted to build up its naval forces in order to challenge the United States. 
This warning time should allow the United States to reconstitute its forces in 
time to fight and defeat any REGT. 
V. FORCE STRUCTURE WITH A 50 PERCENT SPENDING DECREASE 
It would be wrong to create the impression that there is a specific formula 
that will relate budgets and force structure. There can be wide differences in 
opinion with respect to how large a navy can be bought for a given amount of 
money. For example, a recent Congressional Budget Office study contradicted 
the Administration's Base Force figures. They felt the Navy could only live 
without real budget growth if procurement costs for ships and weapons 
remained stable, and the fleet was reduced to 310 ships (including support) by 
2010 (it should be noted that these numbers were contingent on the Navy 
building both Seawolf submarines and AX aircraft).lo Another Congressional 
Budget Office estimate on the effect of additional budget cuts show that an 
additional ten percent cut in the defense budget beyond the Administration's 
original plan (i.e., a $250 billion defense budget) will drive naval force levels 
down to 10 to 11 aircraft carriers and fewer than 400 ships overall; and 
Douglas Johnston's, Executive Vice President for the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, rough rule of thumb for defense cuts states "for each 
additional $50 billion across-the-board cut beyond that already built into the 
defense budget, a reduction of one to two aircraft carriers and about 50 ships 
can be expected."41 
40~ee Congress, Congressional Budget Office, S ta ternen t of Robert F.  Hale, Asst. Director, 
National Security Division, Congr~.ssional Budget Office, Before the Subcommittee on 
Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate 
(Washington, D.C.: CBO, June 14,1991), 4 and 29. 
4 1 ~ .  Johnston, "NATO Realignment and the Maritime Component,"The Submarine 
Review, October 1992,23. 
This paper does not factor in procurement growth, and assumes that 
training and readiness will not be sacrificed in order to maintain a larger force 
structure. Additionally, the effect and cost of decommissioning a large 
number of ships is not accounted for. 
When predicting future force structures, examining alternative ways of 
carrying out roles and missions is difficult. First, no model or test is 
foolproof. Second, the military has a strong operational and tactical bias 
against departing from proven force structures. Although the DON'S recent 
reorganization should help come up with less biased solutions, in the short 
term each warfare specialty is likely to continue to fight for its community's 
"turf," especially if large defense budget cuts occur. Thus, many times 
decisions are based on bureaucratic compromise rather than merit. Finally, 
the political reality of the situation is that the Navy must also convince 
Congress of the merit of alternatives. Seldom is a consensus reached, and the 
results is, once again, bureaucratic c0m~romise.42 
Procurement realities mean that the Navy can really argue over numbers 
rather than type of basic platform to be bought. The only type of aircraft 
carrier that the Navy can presently build is a Nimitz class. An alternative 
type of aircraft carrier would take at least 10 to 15 years to develop. Therefore, 
the Navy can only really decide how many Nimitz-class ships it needs, and 
not on what type of carrier it needs. 
Thus, downsizing tends to be along current force posture rather than 
determining new ways of accomplishing roles and missions. For these 
42~ee  Ulrnan, 190-191; and D. Steigman, "Reorganization: Will It Work?" N a y  Times, 
August 10,1992. 
reasons, the most probable force structure with a 50 percent decrease in 
defense spending would be a proportional cut of the existing force structure. 
Table 6 lists the last published version of the Navy's 600-ship plan, plus 
the composition of the fleet based on proportional reductions of 25 (i.e., the 
Base Force) and 50 percent. In examining the capabilities of this navy it is 
assumed that deployment/maintenance cycles (with respect to length) will be 
similar to today's rate of 33 percent. 
TABLE 6. PROPORTIONAL REDUCTIONS FROM THE GOO-SHIP NAVY 
600-ship Navy 450-ship Navy 300-ship Navy 
- 25% reduction 50% re- 
Ballistic missile submarines 
Aircraft carriers * 
Battleships 
Cruisers & Destroyers ** 
Frigates ** 
General purpose submarines 
Mine countermeasure ship 
Amphibious ships 
Patrol combatants ** 
Combat logistic ships 
Support/auxiliaries 
* Aircraft carrier total includes CV/CVNs in service life extension programs (SLEP), 
maintenance, and includes the auxiliary training carrier (AVT). 
** The Base Force specified 150 surface combatants. 
a. All battleships have already been decommissioned 
b. 20 CG and 46 DD 
c. 8 assault carriers and 30 amphibious warships 
Source: Donald C. Daniel, D.C., "Beyond the 600-ship Navy," Adelphi Paper 261, 14. The 
data for the 25% reduction is from the Bush Administration's planned Base Force. The data for 
the 50% reduction is provided by the author. 
The twelve SSBNs are assumed to be Ohio-class submarines. This 
number is smaller than the START limit of eighteen Ohio-class, to account 
for the expected decrease in the nation's strategic warhead inventory. The 
President's desire to reduce strategic warheads to 40 percent below START 
counting limits will probably result in the Navy needing less SSBNs than 
planned for under the Base Force. The approximately 2300 SLBM warheads 
could be carried on 12 Trident SSBNs (1 Trident SSBN = 24 missiles x 8 
warheads per missile = 192 warheads).43 It is unlikely that SLBMs would be 
de-MIRVed significantly due to the fact this would significantly reduce the 
SSBNs cost e f fec t ivene~s .~~ Eight SSBNs would actually be deployed on 
strategic deterrent patrols (4 per fleet). This issue will be addressed in detail in 
the next chapter. 
The eight aircraft carriers are assumed to be CVNs. One carrier would be 
designated a training carrier and two would be in SLEP/overhaul, and could 
not be used to fulfill any of the roles discussed earlier except reconstitution. If 
one carrier remained home ported in Japan, six aircraft carriers would be 
cycled through the normal deployment cycle. This would result in one 
carrier per fleet forward deployed at any time. If necessary, probably four or 
five carriers could be made available in a crisis with a lot of difficulty 
especially if on different coasts. However, this might mean leaving one of 
the fleets without a forward deployed aircraft carrier. 
43~or a good summary of the President's initiatives with respect to nuclear weapons see 
Department of Defense, "Department of Defense News Briefing on FY93 DoD Budget with 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Donald Atwood, 
ASD (Acquistions) Wedenesday, January 29,1992." 
4 4 ~ ~ ~ ~  refers to Multiple Independent Beentry Yehicles. 
The twenty cruisers are assumed to be Ticonderoga-class. Six to seven 
cruisers would be forward deployed (3-4 per fleet). The forty destroyers are 
assumed to be a mix of thirty-one Spruance-class and fifteen Burke-class. 
Fifteen to sixteen destroyers would be forward deployed (7-8 per fleet). The 
fifty attack submarines are assumed to be a mix of twenty-four Improved Los 
Angeles-class and twenty-six Los Angeles-class. This would result in sixteen 
forward deployed submarines (8 per fleet). The assault carriers are assumed to 
be a mix of four Wasp-class and four Tarawa-class. This would allow two or 
three assault carriers to be forward deployed (1-2 per fleet). Finally, the thirty 
amphibious ships would allow ten to be forward deployed (5 per fleet). Tables 
7 and 8 summarize the number of ships, CVBGs, ARGs, and MEUs per fleet 
that would be forward deployed under the proportional reduction model. 
TABLE 7. NUMBER OF SHIPS FORWARD DEPLOYED UNDER 
PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION MODEL * 
- LANTFLT PACFLT 
Aircraft carriers 1 1 
Cruisers 3 4 
Destroyers 7 8 
Assault carriers 1 1 
Amphibious warships 5 5 
SSBNs 4 4 
General-purpose submarines 8 8 
* Based on a 33 percent deployment rate and an OFTEMPO of 50.5 days/qtr. deployed 
and 29.0 days/qtr. n ~ n d e ~ l o ~ e d ~ ~ .  
Source: The author 
TABLE 8. NUMBER OF CVBGS, ARGS AND MEUS FORWARD DEPLOYED 
UNDER PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION MODEL * 
Catenorv LANTFLT PACFLT 
CVBGs 1 1 
Amphibious ready group 1 1 
MEUs 1 1 
* Based on a 33 percent deployment rate and an OFTEMPO of 50.5 days/qtr. deployed 
and 29.0 days/qtr. nondeployed. 
Source: The author 
In order to enable each fleet to have one carrier battle group (CVBG) and 
one amphibious assault group continuously forward deployed, the size of 
each would have to be reduced. This would seem to be consistent with the 
4 5 ~ e e  insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, "OPTEMPO is the number of days per 
quarter a ship is underway steaming. The Chief of Naval Operations' goal is 50.5 days per 
quarter deployed and 29.0 days per quarter nondeployed. These figures are derived on the 
basis of proven underway requirements to sustain training and operational readiness. These 
balanced guidelines, established to maintain readiness over the long haul, are fully supported 
by the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the 
Navy," 7-9. 
Navy's current plans with respect to future task forces.46 The CVBG 
(excluding frigates and support ships) would include one aircraft carrier, one 
or two cruisers, three or four destroyers, and three attack submarines. The 
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) (excluding frigates and support ships) 
would include one assault carriers, one or two cruisers, three destroyers, two 
or three attack submarines, and five amphibious warships. 
In areas where the CVBG or ARG were not available or their vast power 
were not fully needed to handle a crisis, the Maritime Action Group (MAG) 
could be an alternative building block for naval operations. The MAG, as 
described by VADM William Owens the Navy's Deputy Chief for Resource, 
Warfare Requirements and Assessments, consists of two surface ships 
(usually a cruiser and a destroyer), an attack submarine, and an alert P-3 
aircraft. It possesses significant AAW, ASUW, ASW and strike (via 
Tomahawk cruise missiles) capabilities. Creative deployment ideas, such as 
this, could add needed flexibility to the Navy and help compensate for force 
reductions.47 
If in the future Russia decides to reduce the size of its SSBN force, as 
discussed earlier, there would be a decreased emphasis on strategic ASW. 
Then the proportional reduction model would appear to contain too many 
46~ecretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett, 111 summarized future task forces by stating 
the "... with a smaller fleet -- we will not always have a traditional carrier battle group to 
MODLOC in every potential trouble spot ... It simply won't be possible or necessary ... for us to 
lumbar around everywhere in our Cold War armor of dozen-ship carrier battle groups." 
CHINFO, Washington, D.C., Message 0821042, November 1991; ... From The Sea, Preparing 
the Naval Seraice for the 21st Century; and VADM W. Owens, "Mediterranean Fleet a Test- 
bed for Navy's Future," Armed Forces \ozirnal International, July 1992,32-35. 
47~ee Owens' "Mediterranean Fleet a Test-bed for Navy's Future," 32-5; and ADM. Paul 
David Miller, "Doing the Job with a Smaller Fleet," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 
1992,5537. 
attack submarines. Unless new roles were found for attack submarines, this 
may be an area that could be reduced further.48 In fact some analyst 
recommend the submarine force be cut to pay for the rest of the Navy's force 
structure.49 
It should be noted that in the short term decommissioning nuclear 
submarines does not result in any immediate savings. This is due to the fact 
it costs significantly more to decommission a nuclear submarine than it does 
to operate it. Once built a submarine is the Navy's most cost effective 
platform, with an annual operating cost of only $5 to $10 million. That is 
about one-half that of a destroyer or frigate and only one-third that of a 
cruiser.50 
The rapid decrease to 300 ships by 1997 will make the Navy's ability to act 
as an insurance policy, against the Russian Navy, questionable. In the rush to 
reduce forces there will be little that could be done to influence the size of 
their Navy. If Russia continues to reform itself, the United States can 
probably stand to leave this role unfilled. 
Maritime strategic lift may also suffer under the "50 percent decrease" 
budget. As the various warfare communities fight for funding, strategic lift is 
likely to take a back seat to the Navy's big ticket items. Instead the Navy may 
try to convince the Congress that the nation can rely on chartered vessels. 
Chartered ships, prominently foreign flag ships, delivered half the cargo 
48~or  ideas about future roles and missions see: Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond; 
and Breemer. 
49~ee "Owens: Carrier Level Doesn't Have To Drop If Budget Continues To Decline," Inside 
The Nay, October 5, 1992,3. 
5 0 ~ e e  Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond, 20. 
during Operation Desert ~hie ld /~torm.51 If the U.S. is going to rely on 
coalition warfare under the auspices of international bodies, then the nation 
may be able to rely on foreign flag chartered ships again. The Navy would 
have to convince Congress that it is more cost effective to rely on chartered 
vessels than to buy and maintain a larger sealift capability. This will be 
difficult because the new strategy relies heavily upon the nation's strategic 
lift. If strategic lift is inadequate the whole strategy becomes questionable. 
Currently Congress is demanding more money be spent to improve the 
nation's capability. Therefore, the Navy may be forced to give up warships to 
buy sealift. "Procuring roll-on/roll-off ships and keeping them at high 
readiness (the second tier, after maritime prepositioning) would ensure 
immediate access to needed ships. A program of 30 such ships would provide 
a robust sealift capability at a procurement cost of $4.5 to $7.0 billion 
depending on the mix of new and used ships. Ensuring prompt access to the 
Ready Reserve Force, (the RRF is the third tier), will require $100 to $200 
million a year more in operations and maintenance funds."52 
Table 9 summarizes the composition of the 300-ship model that can be 
afforded under the "50 percent decrease" budget. The specific class of ship is 
only listed for major combatants and amphibious ships. 
51~ee  D. Kassing, "Getting U.S. Military Power to the Desert: An Annotated Briefing,#" 
(Rand Note N-3508-AF/ A/OSD, 1992), p. vi. 








Mine countermeasure ship 
Amphibious Ships 
Patrol combatants 
Combat logistic ships 
Supportlauxiliaries 
Source: The author. 
Class of Ship Number in Each 
Class 
Total Number in 
Ship Type 
12 
VI. COMPARING THE BASE FORCE WITH THE 300-SHIP NAVY 
In this period where there are many individuals who are calling for 
increased defense cuts to reap a ,  "peace dividend" and jump start the 
economy, the issue of what capabilities the nation will lose often is not even 
discussed. The purpose of this chapter is not to become involved in this 
debate over how much the United States should cut out of its defense budget. 
Instead, this chapter will attempt to address objectively the capabilities of the 
Navy under the "50 percent decrease" budget as compared to the capabilities 
of the Navy under the Bush Administration's Base Force. It is hoped that this 
examination of capabilities that the nation will have at a given level of 
defense spending will provide some of the missing ingredients to our 
nation's current defense budget debate by revealing the restrictions these 
spending cuts will place on U.S. foreign policy.53 
A. BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES 
The 300-ship model has six less SSBNs than the Base Force. This might 
not fulfill the National Command Authority's current requirement for 
credible strategic deterrence. However, the strategic situation the United 
53The following discussion, in particular the data concerning the Base Force, is based in 
large part on the insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the 
House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 7-12. It should be noted that the 
station-keeping multipliers cited by ADM Kelso are smaller than those cited by other naval 
analysts. For an example of navy sizing based on forwarddeployment requirements see, Ronald 
O'Rourke, "Naval Forward Deployments and the Size of the Navy," CRS Report for Congress, 
~ovember 13,1992, "Depending on the kind of ship involved, its home port, and the distance to 
overseas operating region, the number of ships of a given kind required to keep one continuously 
forward-deployed in the overseas operating area -- the station-keeping multiplier -- can range 
from 4 to more than 8." 
States faces in the near future will be fundamentally different from the one it 
faced during the Cold War and even from the one it faces today. 
In 1990, U.S. strategic nuclear forces contained some 13,000 individual 
strategic nuclear warheads (4,500 on bombers, 2,500 on intercontinental land- 
based ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 6,000 on submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs)). The START Treaty reduced this 13,000 to 9,500 individual 
strategic nuclear warheads (4,600 on bombers, 1,400 on ICBMs, and 3,500 on 
SLBMs). The START accounting procedures had discounted value for 
strategic nuclear warheads on bombers so the number of accountable 
warheads with respect to START was 6,000.54 
On September 27, 1991, President Bush unilaterally took steps to reduce 
the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and to encourage the Soviets to do the 
same. This included standing down the bomber force from alert, and first 
standing down and then deactivating Minuteman IIs, 450 of U.S. ICBM 
launchers. Soviet President Gorbachev responded positively to these 
measures taking unilateral steps to reduce the Soviet nuclear st0ck~ile.55 
President Bush proposed several unilateral and bilateral strategic nuclear 
force initiatives in his January 28, 1992, State of the Union Address. 
Unilaterally, the President announced the termination of the B-2 at 20 
54~or  a good summary of the number of US. strategic nuclear weapons see Department of 
Defense, "Department of Defense News Briefing on M93 DoD Budget with Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Donald Atwood, ASD (Acquistions) 
Wedenesday, January 29,1992." 
5 5 ~ o r  further details, see Department of Defense, "Department of Defense News Briefing 
with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Pete Williams, 
ASD (Public Affairs) Saturday, September 28, 1991," which followed the President's nuclear 
initiative address on national television; and Jack Mendelsohn, "Comparison of U.S. and Soviet 
Nuclear Cuts," Arms Control Today, November 1991, 27-28. 
aircraft, the cancellation of the small ICBM program, the termination of 
further production of the advanced cruise missile, and the elimination of 
further development of the W-88 warhead56 (although production of the 
Trident D-5 missile would continue).57 
Bilaterally, the President proposed to eliminate all 50 Peacekeeper 
missiles, download the Minuteman 111s from three warheads to one, reduce 
submarine warheads by a third, and shift many of U.S. strategic bombers to 
primarily conventional roles. In return, the President asked the Russians to 
eliminate all MIRVed land-based ICBMs, and to reduce strategic nuclear force 
levels consistent with the change in the threat from the ~ e s t . 5 8  
If all these initiatiyes were achieved U.S. strategic nuclear forces would be 
reduced to 4,700 individual strategic nuclear warheads ( 1,900 on bombers, 500 
on ICBMs and 2300 on SLBMs). Using START accounting procedures this 
would be roughly 3,600 warheads.59 These figures could be reached by the 
year 2003. If the United States assists Russia in the destruction of old 
warheads these numbers could be reached as early as the year 2000.60 
56The W-88 warhead is the heavy warhead (300-475 KT) for the Trident 0-5 missile. For 
more detail see, The Military Balance lNO-199l (London: Brassey's for the International 
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1990) 216-217. 
57~or further details on the President's initiatives see, Department of Defense News 
Briefing on FY 93 DoD Budget, January 29,1992. 
60~ee The Military Balance 1992-1993 (London: Brassey's for the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1992) 220-227. 
To date the Russian response to these initiatives has been very positive. 
Additionally, Russian President Yeltsin has proposed further reductions in 
strategic nuclear forces. His proposals call for reductions to 2,000 to 2,500 
individual strategic warheads per side (this would result in approximately 
1,750 S L B M S ) . ~ ~  
If the United States and Russia follow through on their agreements to de- 
MIRV land based ICBMs, then sea based warheads will comprise the majority 
s 
the world's warheads. To measure the deterrence effectiveness of the 300- 
ship model's SSBN force the number of actual warheads and their equivalent 
megatons (EMT) on patrol needs to be examined.62 Figure 1 demonstrates 
the necessary calculations to determine the EMT on patrol. 
62~quivalent megatonnage (EMT) is used to acknowledge that the destructive power of 
nuclear weapons does not grow proportionately with yield. 
Number of SSBNs on patrol (based on 33 percent deployment rate) 
Assumed number of SSBNs lost to strategic ASW 
Number of surviving SSBNs 
Number of missiles per SSBN 
Number of surviving missiles on patrol 
Assumes 25% of the missiles are withheld for use as a strategic reserve 
Number of missiles on patrol available for use 
Assumed percentage of missiles that will work 
Number of surviving missiles that will work 
Number of warheads per missile 
Number of warheads launched toward Russia 
Assumed percentage of warheads that will work 
Number of warheads that make it to Russia 
Assumed percentage of warheads that survive Russian ABM systems 
Number of warheads that survive and explode 
EMT of one W-76 warhead (eMT= (.I) .2154434 ) 
Amount of EMT on patrol (does not include those missiles withheld for strategic 
reserve) 
Source: The autkor. The Militnry Balance 1990-1991 was used to obtain data for the 
missiles and warheads. 
Figure 1. Conservative Estimate of the Equivalent Megatons on Patrol 
Under the 300-Ship Model 
The level of destruction required to reach our nation's "assured 
destruction" capability, which was based on a judgment reached by the 
Secretary of Defense and accepted by the President and Congress, has been 
influenced by the fact of strongly diminishing marginal returns. This level 
was determined to be 400 EMT. Delivering more warheads above this 
amount would not significantly change the amount of damage inflicted.63 
The very conservative calculations used in Figure 1 demonstrate that the 
300-ship model's SSBN force could deliver 522 EMT and still maintain a 
63~or a more detailed discussion concerning the level of EMT required for "assured 
destruction" see, Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the 
DqCense Program 1961-1969 (San Francisco and London: Harper Colophon Books, 1971), 207-210; 
and Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 
1989), 369. 
sizable strategic reserve capability. Therefore, the 300-ship model's SSBN 
force appears to meet the nation's "assured destruction" capability 
requirements for the post Cold War era. It also demonstrates that the SSBN 
force alone is all that is necessary if the nation shifts from a countervailing 
strategy/targeting to an assured destruction strategy/targeting. 
B. FORWARD PRESENCE 
The 300-ship model represents a 25% force reduction from the Base Force. 
This reduction, and adherence to current employment policies, would result 
in a significant reduction in U.S. naval forces forward operations. This would 
force the National Co,mmand Authority and the Unified Commanders-in- 
Chiefs (CINCs) to either decrease the forward presence requirements or 
change the Chief of Naval Operation's employment policy guidelines. These 
numbers are derived on the basis of proven underway requirements to 
sustain training and operational readiness. These balanced guidelines, 
established to maintain readiness over the long haul, are fully supported by 
the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Secretary of the ~ a v ~ . 6 4  
L OFTEMPO 
As discussed earlier OFTEMPO is the number of days per quarter a 
ship is underway steaming. The goal is 50.5 days per quarter deployed and 
29.0 days per quarter non-deployed.65 The Navy has not been able to fulfill 
these goal for deployed ships since the late 1970s, and has just barely been able 
%ee insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 7. 
to meet the goal for non-deployed ships, and this is with a navy significantly 
larger than the Base ~orce.66 Therefore, the 300-ship model could not met 
these guidelines unless there was a significant reduction in current 
employment policies. 
If current employment policies are reduced significantly then the 
"forward presence" pillar of the Bush Administration's new strategy might 
crumble. This is due to the Navy's probable increased responsibility in 
fulfilling this role under this new strategy (as discussed earlier). 
Conversely, if the OPTEMPO goal is increased so the 300-ship model 
can fulfill the current employment policies then the Navy's upkeep, 
maintenance and training operations policies will have to be revised. The 
long term result of these changes would be a less ready and poorer trained 
navy. 
2. PERSTEMPO 
PERSTEMPO is a consideration of the time available for Navy 
personnel for "training and other aspects of Quality of ~ife."67 Once again a 
reduction to 300 ships without a corresponding reduction in operational 
requirements will result in longer deployments, shorter turn around time 
between deployments, and less training conducted in home port. This is 
likely to result in a less trained force with a lower quality of life. This is due 
to the fact most formal schooling opportunities, for personnel assigned to 
naval vessels, occur while the ship is non-deployed and that family 
separation will increase significantly. Given the fact that the United States 
66~bid., Figure 9. 
67~bid., 7. 
plans to remain an all volunteer military force, this is likely to cause morale 
and retention in the naval service to fall. 
3. Combined Exercises 
Last year, Navy ships and Marine Corps personnel participated in 288 
exercises involving 60 nations. Figure 2 shows the exercises in which U.S. 
naval forces were participating in on March 11, 1992 (the date of the CNO's 
testimony before congress).68 The 300-ship model would result in 
1 
significantly fewer assets being available to participate in combined exercises. 
Exercise Name 
TEAMWORK 92 






CV Surface SSN 
Ships 
1 5 4 
3 1 
Amphib Spt Total 







TOTAL SHIPS: 37 
Source: Insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, Figure 11. 
Figure 2. Exercise Commitments (March 11,1992) 
The ability to work effectively witheour allies, in coalition style 
warfare at the strategic and operational level of warfare, is one of the 
underlying elements that the Bush Administration's new strategy depends 
upon if the strategy is to succeed. The reduced opportunities to practice this 
v 
style of warfare through combined exercises seriously reduces the 
effectiveness of new strategy. 
C RESPONSE TIME 
Response time is the time between the start of the crisis and the arrival of 
ships. According to ADM Kelso, "with the Bush Administration's proposed 
Base Force, the Navy, deploying about 30 percent of the available fleet, could 
provide an immediate response to a crisis anywhere in the world within 
seven days. It would comprise one Amphibious Strike Task Force, consisting 
of one CVBG and an ARG with an embarked MEU. A second CVBG could be 
available within fifteen days. A full MEB could arrive within thirty days. 
Hence, the most the sea services could deliver to a crisis area under this plan 
is a token force within a week, and a force about the size of one Army light 
division with an additional few squadrons of aircraft within a month."69 
Due to fewer ships in the 300-ship model, and without a change in 
current employment policies, the Navy would have fewer ships on station 
and more often no CVBG in theater to respond to a crisis. This would result 
in a delay in the arrival of the first CVBG if the crisis occurs during a period 
when no CVBG is on station in theater. Furthermore, fewer ships would be 
in a state of readiness to quickly deploy to the crisis, resulting in significant 
delays in the arrival of additional CVBGs deployed from U.S. bases. These 
delays in the arrival of initial forces could translate into critical delays in the 
arrival of heavy ground and air units.70 Additionally, this increased 
response time could cause the crisis to develop into a situation requiring 
deployment of a larger number of U.S. forces. 
695, Tritten's "The New National Security Strategy and the Base Force," 23. 
705, insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 8. 
D. CVBG REQUIREMENTS 
Under the 300-ship model the eight aircraft carriers are assumed to be 
CVNs. One carrier would be designated a training carrier and two would be 
in SLEP/overhaul. This represents a reduction of five operational aircraft 
carriers (7 vice 12 CV/CVNs) when compared to the Bush Administration's 
Base Force. Operation Desert Shield/Storm is a useful example to 
demonstrate the effect this reduction will have on the nation's ability to get 
CVBGs to crisis areas. Figure 3 shows the number of CVBGs that the Navy of 
February 1991 (note this force is bigger than the proposed Based Force) could 
sustain on station throughout this eight month crisis that the Navy 
participated in.71 
6 Engaged in combat operations 
3 Ready to Respond 
2 Rotated to CONUS 
8 Unavailable (depot maintenance) 
14 Total CV/CVNs in the inventory (excludes AVT and CVN-72, which was 
not ready for combat operations) 
Source: Insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 9. 
Figure 3. CVBGs in Operation Desert ShielcUStorm 
According to the CNO, "using this Desert Shield/Storm example, it took 
2.33 CVBGs (6 of 14) to sustain the participation of one CVBG engaged in 4 
combat operations throughout the crisis and fulfill the other requirements 
v 
imposed on the Navy by the nation's leaders. The three CVBGs that were 
classified "ready to respond" and the two classified "rotated to CONUS" 
represent the rotational base needed to sustain the six CVBG level of effort 
71~ee Ibid, 8-9; for CVBG datd during Desert Shield/Storm. 
required by Desert Shield/Storm. These five CVBGs could have responded to 
a second contingency, or been used to augment forces in Desert Storm, if 
necessary."72 
Thus, the Navy could have responded with eleven CVBGs in February 
1991, if it deferred some routine maintenance and held in abeyance peacetime 
employment policies (OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO). This effort could not of been 
maintained indefinitely, but could have been maintained for two sequential 
crises of Desert Shield/Storm duration. Therefore, this maximum effort 
would require 1.27 CVBCs (1 1 of 14) to sustain the participation of one CVBG 
engaged in combat 0~erations.73 
Current peacetime employment practices for each of the three forward 
deployed aircraft carriers employed by the Unified CINCs require a total of 
four CV/CVNs. This 1:4 ratio uses a methodology which includes factors 
such as transit time, deployment length, and maintenance and training 
requirements.74 
Table 10 uses these factors discussed above to determine how well the 
Base Force and 300-ship model would_do in fulfilling a Desert Shield/Storm 
size crisis and the current peacetime employment practices. The Base Force is 
capable of fulfilling the current peacetime forward presence and rapid crisis 
response requirements. The Base Force comes close but is not able to match 
the Desert Storm equivalent goal of sustaining six CVBGs in combat 
operations, and would have a difficult time doing much more than 
741bid., 9 and Figure 13. 
responding with a holding force to a second contingency of Desert Storm's 
equivalent. Overall, this force is judged capable of fulfilling the Bush 
Administration's goal of handling one and one-half crises. 
TABLE 10. CVBG CAPABILITY OF THE BASE FORCE AND 300-SHIP 
MODEL 
Type of Operation Factor CVBGs Available CVBGs Available 
(Base Force) * (300-ship Model) * 
Forward Presence and Rapid Crisis 1 :4 3 
Response 
Sustainable Combat Ops (Desert 1:2.33 5 
Storm equivalent) 
Maximum Possible Combat 1:1.27 9 
Operations Effort 
* These numbers are rounded to the next highest whole number. 
Source: The factors are from the insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 8-9. Data 
for the Base Force and 300-ship model determined by the author. 
The 300-ship model falls far short of being able to fulfill the Bush 
Administration's current goals. Unless the unified CINCs current 
requirements were changed only two carriers would be able to be kept forward 
deployed fulfilling forward presence and rapid crisis response roles. This will 
make the United States less able to deter crises and slow the U.S. response 
when attempting to handle crises before they escalate to a point that a large 
U.S. force deployment is required to successfully solve the crisis. 
Additionally, while the nation may be able to succeed with only three CVBGs 
in joint operations where significant coalition land air bases are available, it 
would be difficult for the U.S. military to fight its way into areas where it had 
to secure hostile air bases for its use. Although some may argue that with 
maximum effort the 300-ship model is still able to respond with six CVBGs, it 
must be noted that this response would be significantly longer than the 
required time it took to get six CVBGs to Desert Shield/Storm in February 
1991. 
E. SURFACE COMBATANT (SC) REQUIREMENTS 
The requirements for surface combatants (SCs) can be calculated using the 
same methodology used to determine CVBG requirements. The SCs are a 
major part of the Unified CINC's three required forward operating CVBGs 
and additionally comprise the Middle East Force (MEF), support Counter- 
Narcotic Operations, UNITAS, and Standing Forces Atlantic commitments. 
A total requirement of 40 SCs is needed to fulfill these commitments on a 
continuous basis. Current peacetime employment policies, which take into 
consideration transit times, deployment length, and maintenance and 
training requirements, result in a deployed to non-deployed ratio of 1:3.75.~~ 
Analysis of the number of SCs used in Operation Desert Shield/Storm 
and of the maximum possible two contingency effort indicate that deployed to 
non-deployed ratios are the same as those used to determine the CVBG 
requirements for these two categories. The required number of SCs needed to 
match these efforts are 73 and 134 SCs respectively76 Table 11 use these 
v factors to determine how well the Base Force and 300-ship model would do in 
751bid., 10 and Figure 13. 
76~or exact calculations see, bid., 10 and Figure 13. 
fulfilling a Desert Shield/Storm size crisis and current peacetime 
employment practices. 
TABLE 11. SURFACE COMBATANT CAPABILITY OF THE BASE FORCE 
AND 300-SHIP MODEL 
Type of Operation Required Factor SCs Available SCs Available 
SCs (Base Force) * (300-ship Model)* 
Forward Presence and Rapid 40 1:3.75 40 
Crisis Response 
Sustainable Combat Ops (Desert 73 1:2.33 64 
Storm equivalent) 
Maximum Possible Combat 134 1:1.27 118 95 
Operations Effort 
* These numbers are rounded to the next highest whole number. 
Source: The factors are from the insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 10. Data for 
the Base Force and 300-ship model determined by the author. 
The results of this analysis of the SC requirements are identical to that of 
the CVBG requirement analyses. The 300-ship model falls far short of being 
able to fulfill the Bush Administration's current goals. Unless the unified 
CINCs current requirements were changed, surface combatants would not be 
able to fulfill their forward presence and rapid crisis response roles using 
traditional deployment modes. New and innovative methods to fulfill these 
roles might help make up for the lack of numbers.77 Still the U.S. response, 
n ~ ~ r  ideas concerning possible future deployment modes see, Secretary of the Navy, H. 
Lawrence Garrett, III summarized future task forces by stating the "... with a smaller fleet -- we 
will not always have a traditional carrier battle group to MODLOC in every potential trouble 
spot ... It simply won't be possible or necessary ... for us to lumbar around everywhere in our Cold 
War armor of dozen-ship carrier battle groups." CHINFO, Washington, D.C., Message 
0821042, November 1991; ... From The Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century; 
VADM W. Owens, "Mediterranean Fleet a Test-bed for Navy's Future," 32-35; and ADM. P. D. 
Miller, "Doing the Job with a Smaller Fleet," 55-57. 
when attempting to handle crises before they escalate to a point that a large 
U.S. force deployment is required to successfully solve the crisis, will be 
significantly slower than what was experienced during Operation Desert 
Shield/Storm. 
F. ATTACK SUBMARINES 
Attack submarines are forward deployed with CVBGs to provide 
indication and warning and act as a potent force multiplier for the CVBG's 
capabilities in strike, anti-submarine (ASW), and anti-surface warfare 
(ASUW). Attack submarines are also forward deployed independently to 
provide the nation with unique intelligence, strike, strategic ASW, and 
special operations capabilities. Currently the Unified CINCs require 
approximately 14 continuously forward deployed attack submarine~.~8 The 
300-ship model with its total of 50 attack submarines (16 of which would be 
continuously forward deployed) can fulfill the CINC's requirements. Unless 
new roles are found for attack submarines this may be an area where further 
cuts could be made.79 
G. AMPHIBIOUS LIFI' 
Tables 12 and 13 summarize the amphibious lift capability under the 300- 
ship model and the lift requirements for various Marine Corps force 
struclres (MEU, MEB, and MEF). They demonstrate that if all amphibious 
78See insert for the record to ADM Keiso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 11. 
79The Submarine Force and Naval Submarine League have conducted numerous 
studies/symposiums to determine new and innovative future roles and missions for the 
Submarine Force. For examples see Submarine Roles in the 2990s and Beyond; Breemer; and 
Tritten's "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium." 
ships in the entire navy were made available there would only be enough lift 
to transport approximately 28,000 troops (this is the approximate size of the 
assault echelon (AE) for one MEF). 
TABLE 12. AMPHIBIOUS L I J T  CAPABILITY UNDER THE 300-SHIP MODEL 



















Helo a LCAC 
TOTALS 38 27,824 773,200 1,347,800 320 64 
a. Helo spots are measured in CH-46 equivalents. 1 CH-46= 1.88 CH-53E or 1.38 AV-8B 
or .86 AH-1W. 
Source: Polmar, N. The Ships nnd Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 14th ed. (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1987). Number of ships from the author's 300-ship model. 
TABLE 13. AMPHIBIOUS LIFT REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE BASE FORCE 
IN 1997 
Troop Berthing 2,758 9,445 24,674 
Vehicle Space (ft3) 62,615 255,125 627,253 
Cargo Space (ft3) 164,026 451,746 823,593 
Deck Spots e 167 345 
LCAC Spots 6 22 58 
* The MEU embarks on an  LHA or LHD which has a "typical" composite squadron of 18 
'CH-46,4 CH-53,4 AH-lW, and 2 UH-1Ns. 
a. The amphibious lift requirement actually represents only what is needed to lift the 
assault echelon (AE) of the force. The remaining troops, vehicles, and cargo will be 
transported to the area by Military Sea Lift Command vessels. 
Source: The author is indebted to LT K. Szczublewski, USN, for performing the original 
calculations used to develop this table. 
Using the number of ships forward deployed under the 300-ship model 
(see Table 7), there will be sufficient ships available to keep a MEU-level 
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) forward deployed in each fleet. Table 14 
details the composition for the MEU ARG and the percentage of required lift 
it provides using data from Table 13. 
TABLE 14. MEU ARG LIFT CAPABILITY 
- CatePorv LiuL 
LHD-1 Troop Capacity 142% 
LSD-41 Vehicle Space 184% 
LST-1179 Cargo Space 133% 
LSD-49 Helicopter Spots n/a 






LSD-41 Vehicle Space 
LST-1179 Cargo Space 
LSD-49 Helicopter Spots 
LSD-36 LCAC Spots 
LKA-113 
* ARG composition based on data from Table 7. 
Source: The author. 
Using these projected capabilities, at what level of warfare can the United 
States conduct forced entry amphibious missions? To determine this one 
must examine the operational (e.g., Operation Desert Shield/Storm) and 
tactical (e.g.. Operation Urgent Fury) levels of warfare and the capability of a 
MEU, MEB, and MEF to operate at those levels. 
The need for this unilateral capability was stated in the National Military 
Strategy 1992 as follows: 
"While we emphasize multinational operations under the auspices of international 
bodies such as the United Nations, we must retain the capability to act unilaterally when 
and where U.S. interests dictate."80 
8 0 ~ e e  National Military Strategy 1992. 6. 
Thus, although coalition warfare is preferred, there may be instances 
where a U.S. vital interest is threatened and host nation support is not 
available in the crisis area. 
The operational level of warfare is defined as involving a corps size force. 
The size of a MEF is projected to be 37,052 total personnel under the Base 
Force. As described in Table 13, the assault echelon for a MEF would be 24,674 
personnel, and could be lifted to a crisis only if all amphibious ships were 
available. Due to overhauls and maintenance only about two-thirds of these 
ships could ever be available at once. Thus it is unlikely that the 
Navy/Marine Corps team could even get one division lifted to conduct forced 
entry missions. Even if one MEF was lifted, it is too small to conduct forced 
entry missions even at the low end of the operational level of warfare. 
The tactical level of warfare is fought at the division level or below. The 
MEF would be an ideal size unit at this level, but, as mentioned above, the 
time and resources that it would take to collect and deploy such a force rules it 
out for rapid response. 
A MEB can be lifted to the crisis although a lot of difficulty would be 
encountered. It would require all the forward deployed amphibious ships of 
both fleets and some non-deployed forces to be committed to the crisis. Thus 
one fleet would have no ARC; forward deployed. Although it would take 
time to get it there, a MEB should be able to handle some crises that occur at 
the tactical level, or seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base, or 
coastal air base to allow the entry of heavier Army or Air Force forces. 
The MEU that is kept forward deployed in each fleet is best suited to 
conducting missions, such as, non-combatant evacuation operations, 
amphibious raids, a presence force or a force enabler for heavier follow on 
forces. Due to its small size and lack of heavy armor, the employment of a 
MEU for the purpose of establishing a force on a hostile shore should be 
viewed with caution. The MEU can operate only at the low end of the tactical 
level of warfare. 
Therefore, the 300-ship model would limit future amphibious operations 
to "Grenada" size operations. Even this size of operation would require 
longer planning/slower response time due to the smaller number of forward 
deployed amphibious ships. Although the purpose of this paper is not to 
discuss cuts in the Marine Corps force structure, these facts suggest that 
additional cuts in their force structure would also be warranted under the "50 
percent decrease " b ~ d ~ e t . 8 1  
H. COMBAT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT/AUXILIARIES FORCE 
The size of the Combat Logistic Force for the 300-ship model is a 
proportional reduction of the 600-ship model and the proposed Base Force. 
Depending upon the mix and capabilities of the ships, this force would likely 
meet the logistics requirements needed to allow the 300-ship model to 
perform as described in Tables 10 and 11. 
The size of the Support/Auxiliaries Force for the 300-ship model is a 
proportional reduction of the 600-ship model, but is only half of the proposed 
Base Force. Depending upon the mix and capabilities of the ships, this force 
would likely meet the logistics requirements needed to allow the 300-ship 
model to perform as described in Tables 10 and 11. It should be noted that 
81The author is indebted to LT K. Szczublewski, USN for his research in the area of 
Marine Corps amphibious assault capabilities. 
with the draw down in overseas bases and their logistics infrastructure these 
assets will become more critical. As these bases are closed the 
Support/Auxiliaries forces will need to be increased to allow the 300-ship 
model to performed as described earlier. 
I. SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL CONFLICTS 
Approximately 170 U.S. naval ships were directly involved at some point 
in the eight month long Operation Desert Shield/Storm. A similar number 
of ships would be required in support of a Korea conflict (Korea is used as an 
example of a MRC, other scenarios could also be used).82 The combined total 
of the ships required to handle two MRC greatly exceeds the capability of the 
300-ship model, especially if units required for redeployment, rotation, 
maintenance, training, or responding to other needs. The 300-ship model 
would not be able to adequately respond to two MRC. 
The 300-ship model's ability to fulfill the Bush Administration's goal of 
handling one and one-half crises simultaneously is uncertain. This goal 
might be accomplished if the second crisis (i.e., the "one-half" crisis) was a 
LRC and if the Army, Air Force, and Navy were split among the crises. An 
example of this would be similar to the evacuation of Liberia (Operation 
Sharp Edge) which was conducted by the Navy during Operation Desert 
~torm.83 An alternate method to accomplish this goal might be to fight one 
82~ee insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 4-5 and 8. 
83~ee S. Weeks. 'Crafting a New Maritime Strategy,'' U.S. N U M ~  lnsfitute Proceedings. 
January 1992'30-7. 
crisis and deter/conduct a holding operation against the second crisis with 
SSNs or a MAG. 
J. TRAINING CARRIER 
One option to improve the ability of the 300-ship model to fulfill the 
CVBG requirements might be to get rid of the requirement for a dedicated 
training carrier (AVT). This might theoretically free up another carrier to be 
used in the normal operational rotation cycle. e 
According to Navy studies, "not having an AVT in the total carrier force 
P. 
would increase the annual underway requirement for each non-deployed 
CV/CVN. If the AVT were activated for a crisis and other deployable 
CV/CVNs were used in place of a dedicated AVT for flight training it would 
displace required upkeep, maintenance, and pre-deployment training. If 
activated, the AVT would require extensive overhaul to restore inactivated 
systems, replace intermediate maintenance capabilities, and modernize and 
reactivate command and control capabilities. Additional time would also be 
required for the training of the reconstituted crew and airwing."84 Therefore, 
eliminating the requirement for a AVT does not appear to be a valid method 
of freeing up another carrier for use in the normal operational cycle, but 
could be used during reconstitution. 
* 
84~ee insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee's Subcornmi ttee on Defense, 11. 
K COUNTER-NARCOTIC OPERATIONS 
Throughout 1991, sixty percent of the surface force participated in 
counter-narcotics operations at one time or the other.85 With the decrease of 
surface forces under the 300-ship model the Navy will no longer have the 
assets needed to fulfill this role completely. Therefore, the Navy may be 
forced to give up much of its role of combating drugs in order to accomplish 
other higher priority roles. 
Many already question the military's effectiveness at handling this role. 
Feeling that it could be better fulfilled by police agencies.86 Therefore, if the 
Navy is forced to give up this role it will have only a small effect on the 
nation's drug problem. 
L. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
The 300-ship model would require a draw down of about 90,000 military 
personnel beyond the planned reductions of approximately 70,000 personnel 
associated with the reduction to the Base Force. This draw down would be 
driven by the lower manning requirements for 150 fewer ships and the 
corresponding reductions in shore support, and headquarters and command 
staffs. These additional reductions would likely necessitate large scale 
reductions in forces ( R I F ) . ~ ~  
86See Ulman, 65-70; and W. Matthew, "Biden: Military Ineffective in Drug War," Navy 
Times, March 9, 1992. 
8 7 ~ a t a  for the 300-ship model is determined by the author based on proportional 
reductions. For supporting data see, insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 11. 
According to the CNO, "the Navy required twenty home ports (ten major 
complexes and ten other smaller, stand alone bases) to support a 600-ship 
navy. At present the Navy has capacity beyond that required to support 
today's ~ a v ~ . " 8 8  Reducing to the 300ship model will mean fewer bases will 
be required. Navy studies indicate that fifteen home ports are needed to 
support the Base Force. Reducing to the 300-ship model will mean fewer 
bases will be required, it is estimated that only ten home ports are needed to 
C 
support the 300-ship model. This will result in a proportional reduction of 
approximately 50,000 additional civilian personnel.89 
x. 
Reductions of an additional $175 billion (this is in addition to the amount 
already removed in the Bush Administration's proposed FY 93 DOD budget) 
over the FY 93-97 period would result in further reductions to the DON'S 
acquisition, research and development (R&D), and U.S. Marine Corps 
accounts. This is likely to have a direct impact on force modernization 
programs and future naval capabilities. This is also likely to jeopardize the 
reconstitution pillar of the Bush Administration's new strategy since with 
decreased R&D funds it will take longer to reconstitute. 
It is doubtful that the nation could maintain either a credible naval 
shipbuilding capability or naval superiority given the outlay implications of 
the "50 percent decrease" budget. Thus, the Navy's ability to accomplish its 4 
reconstitution roles is doubtful under the 300-ship model. 
* 
89~a t a  for the 300-ship model is determined by the author based on proportional 
reductions. For Base Force data see, insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11,1992 
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 12 and 
Figure 16. 
M. CONCLUSIONS 
The 300-ship model could result in a significant reduction in the U.S. 
international forward presence. This possible reduction in forward presence 
could result in the United States being less likely to positively influence 
world events and deter crises which threaten our vital interests. 
Additionally, the reduction in forward presence will decrease the nation's 
crisis response capability. This slower response could ultimately force the 
United States to deploy a larger number of troops when it does decide to 
intervene in a crisis. 
If these drastic reduction in forces occur, the nation's ability to respond 
unilaterally, at the operational level of warfare, when American interests are 
threatened is questionable.90 The United States would only be able to project 
power conventionally at the tactical level of warfare. Therefore, the United 
States would be forced to rely more heavily on joint and coalition warfare to 
accomplish its objectives. There would be no way to accomplish the "Pax 
Americana" strategy that some in the DOD have discussed.91 
The 300-ship model navy's ability to fulfill the Bush Administration's 
goal of handling one and one-half crises simultaneously is uncertain. Due to 
its reduced force structure, the 300-ship model's response time would be 
slower than what the Navy has traditionally been able to accomplish. 
Successful future crisis response will rely heavily on joint/coalition 
operations using a mix of active and selective reserve units. 
90~nder  the Reagan Administration's proposed MXFship Navy the United States could 
respond unilaterally at the operational level of warfare. 
91~atrick E. Tyler, "Defense Leadership Wants New Watchdog Role for U.S. Military." 
New York Times, March 7, 1992. 
The 300-ship model should be able to provide a credible strategic 
deterrence against the use of mass destruction against the United States and 
its allies. Due to its decreased size and capability it is doubtful that it will be 
able to act as an insurance policy with respect to a REGT, or deter the use of 
conventional weapons against the United States or its allies. 
Finally, the 300-ship model's ability to fulfill all of its reconstitution roles 
is doubtful. The Navy could probably still guarantee the freedom of the seas, 
but its reduced capability might tempt a potential adversary to attempt to 
build a naval force which could credibly threaten the U.S. Navy. 
Additionally, the United States would probably not be able to maintain a 
credible naval shipbuilding capability under the drastic cuts called for under 
the "50 percent decrease" budget. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The end of the Cold War has resulted in major changes in the 
international and national security environments that have major 
implications for the US. military. These changes include calls for significant 
defense budget cuts, the increased importance of economics as a determinant 
of defense spending and the disintegration of the Soviet Union which 
resulted in the absence of a clear tangible global threat to U.S. national 
interests. What has resulted from these changes is the formulation of a new 
U.S. national security strategy that focuses on the uncertain threat of regional 
crises and contingencies instead of global war as the basis for U.S. military 
forces, and the decision to cut U.S. defense budget/forces by at least 25-30%. 
This fundamental change, as enunciated in the National Security Strategy 
of the United States and the National Military Strategy, requires a 
comprehensive reexamination of service strategies and programming. This 
examination is well underway as each service struggles to determine its 
contribution in the post-Cold War world. What has yet to be determined is 
the exact amount which will be cut from the U.S. defense budget and what 
restrictions these cuts will place on U.S. foreign policy. This paper attempted 
to address objectively the capabilities of the 300-ship Navy that could be 
afforded with an assumed fifty percent decrease in defense spending and the 
restrictions that this size navy would place on U.S. foreign policy. 
Strategic Deterrence and Defense 
Although, at first glance, the 300-ship model's twelve Ohio-class SSBNs 
(eight of which would be on strategic deterrent patrols at a time) might not 
I fulfill the nation's current countervailing strategy requirements for credible I strategic deterrence, the strategic situation that the United States faces in the 
near future will be fundamentally different from the one it faced during the 
Cold War and even the one it faces today. If the United States and Russia 
continue to follow through on their agreements to reduce the size of their 
strategic nuclear forces, then at some point the United States will be forced to 
shift to an assured destruction strategy. 
The level of destruction required to fulfill the United States' assured 
, destruction capability, which was determined by the Secretary of Defense and 
accepted by the President and Congress, is 400 EMT. Very conservative 
calculations of the EMT on patrol under the 300-ship model show that the 
SSBN force could deliver 522 EMT and still maintain a sizable strategic 
reserve capability. Therefore, the 300-ship model's SSBN force appears to 
meet the nation's assured destruction capability requirements for the post 
Cold War era. Additionally, it demonstrates that the SSBN force alone is all 
that is needed if the nation shifts from a countervailing strategy to an assured 
destruction strategy. 
The 300-ship model's ability to hold an adversary's nuclear weapons or 
other weapons of mass destruction at risk is significantly less than the Bush 
Administration's Base Force. This is due to its reduced number of platforms 
that will be forward deployed and its slower response to crises. This might 
force the nation to accept a strategy which punishes an adversary for use of 
these weapons rather than a strategy which holds these weapons at risk. 
The 300-ship model will use the same assets as the Base Force to hold an 
adversary's weapon of mass destruction at risk. Attack submarines and 
maritime patrol aircraft would be used to conduct strategic ASW against an 
adversary's SSBN force. Carrier battle groups and cruise missile capable 
surface ships and submarines are capable of fulfilling this role against Third 
World nations with relatively small numbers of these weapons. 
The 300-ship model's ability to deter the use of conventional weapons 
against the United States or its allies is also significantly less than the Base 
Force. This is due to the 300-ship models reduced capability to respond 
quickly to emerging crises. 
Finally, the 300-ship model's ability to act as an insurance policy against a 
REGT is questionable. In the rush to reduce forces there will be little that 
could be done to influence the size of the Russian or any other navy. If 
Russia continues to reform itself, the United States can probably stand to 
leave this role unfilled. 
Forward Presence 
In this new era of regional threats the need for forward presence has 
become more important. The 300-ship model has the ability to fulfill this 
role, but not as well as the Bush Administration's Base Force. Due to the fact 
that the 300-ship model could only maintain two CVBGs available for 
forward presence and rapid crisis response, the Navy could no longer use the 
traditional methods it has used to fulfill this role. There are though several 
alternatives the Navy could use to improve the 300-ship model's forward 
presence ability. 
The first alternative would be to change the Chief of Naval Operation's 
employment policy guidelines. This may provide some short term 
improvement in the 300-shp model's ability to fulfill the forward presence 
role, but in the long run it would cause more problems than it solved. If 
OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO goals were increased so the 300-ship model 
could fulfill current employment policies then the Navy's upkeep, 
maintenance and training operations would suffer. The long term result of 
these changes would be a less ready and poorer trained navy. 
Another alternative would be for the Unified CINCs and National 
I Command Authority to decrease the Navy's forward presence requirements 
and use non-Navy assets to fulfill the nation's forward presence obligations. 
This might be done by permanent or temporary stationing of land based 
I forces overseas, access and storage agreements, military to military relations, 
or overflights from U.S. based aircraft. It still needs to be determined if these 
methods could cost effectively show credible U.S. commitment and enhance 
regional stability as well as the traditional naval methods used in the past. 
A third alternative would be to design a navy which emphasized a mix of 
both high cost/high capability platforms and low cost/low capability 
platforms. This would allow the Navy to maintain a larger force structure 
under the assumed "50 percent decrease" budget. With more numbers the 
Navy could use more traditional methods as it tried to fulfill all its forward 
presence requirements. 
A final alternative would be to use new deployment force structures to 
fulfill some of the missions that have traditionally been filled by CVBGs. 
This could include using ARGs, MAGS or even a single ship to fulfill forward 
presence missions. This alternative appears to be consistent with the Bush 
Administration's new definition of forward presence. While this may be a 
successful method in areas where a potential adversary's military capability is 
low, a potential adversary with a relatively strong military may not view such 
a force with the same amount of fear/respect. It may also force the United 
States to view forward presence operations under a new light. Under this 
alternative, in many cases ships would be operating with little assistance in 
the immediate area. Therefore, the United States may, have to be willing to 
accept the loss of a ship and then respond to the loss, rather than the 
traditional method in which a force with such a large combat capability is 
deployed that it prevents a potential adversary from being able to effectively 
attack any one ship. 
The 300-ship model possesses significantly less assets which can be used to 
conduct joint and combined exercises. The ability to work effectively with the 
other U.S. armed forces and our allies, in joint/coalition style warfare will be 
adversely affected by the reduced opportunities the Navy will have to practice 
this style of warfare. Since the Bush Administration's new strategy relies 
heavily on joint/coalition warfare, this could pose serious problems during 
future military operations. 
With the decrease of surface forces under the 300-ship model the Navy 
will no longer have the needed assets to fulfill its counter-narcotic role and 
still fulfill higher priority roles. This will have little effect on the nation's 
role unfulfilled. 
The 300-ship model's ability to overtly and covertly collect intelligence, 
and then transmit real-time information to the National Command 
Authority in time to avert or mitigate crises is significantly less than Base 
Force's ability. This is primarily due to its reduced number of intelligence 
collection assets. Since the Bush Administration's new strategy relies heavily 
on the nation's intelligence collection ability, the 300-ship model's decrease in 
intelligence collection capability could undermine the new strategy's 
effectiveness. 
Finally, the 300-ship model provides significantly reduced crisis response 
capability when compared to the Base Force. Due to fewer ships in the 300- 
ship model, and without a change in current employment policies, the Navy 
would have fewer ships on station and more often no CVBG in theater to 
respond to a crisis. This will result in a significant reduction in naval forces 
which the National Command Authority could use to react to ambiguous 
warning in the early stages of a crisis. A timely show of force during this stage 
could stabilize the situation and permit diplomacy to prevail. With no naval 
expeditionary forces in the crisis area the risk versus gain calculus of potential 
adversaries is simplified and could cause them to undertake action counter to 
U.S. interest. 
Furthermore, fewer ships would be in a state of readiness to quickly 
deploy to the crisis, resulting in significant delays in the arrival of additional 
CVBGs deployed from U.S. bases. These delays in the arrival of initial forces 
could translate into critical delays in the arrival of heavy ground and air 
units. Additionally, this increased response time could cause the crisis to 
develop into a situation requiring deployment of a larger number of U.S. 
forces. 
Crisis Response 
The end of the Cold War may result in increased regional conflicts fueled 
by ethnic, cultural or economic differences, or control of resources. The range 
U and scope of these contingencies could be many and varied. When U.S. 
interests are threatened, American forces must be able to respond rapidly to 
deter and if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort with 
other nations. With only three CVBGs available crisis response, as compared 
to five under the Bush Administration's Base Force, the 300-ship model could 
not meet the new strategy's stated naval crisis response goals but could 
provide some crisis response at the tactical level of warfare. These goals are to 
use peacetime presence forces to respond to a crisis with one CVBG and a 
MEU within seven days, and a second CVBG within fourteen days. Forward 
deployed and surge forces are to be used to form expeditionary Strike Fleets 
within thirty days. If these actions are not able to contain the crisis, then 
combined air, land, and sea forces would be organized within sixty days. 
This will make the United States less able to deter crises and slow the U.S. 
b response when attempting to handle crises before they escalate to a point that 
a large U.S. force deployment is required to successfully solve the crisis. 
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Additionally, while the nation may be able to succeed with only three CVBGs 
in joint operations where significant coalition land air bases are available, it 
would be difficult for the US. military to fight its way into areas where it had 
to secure hostile air bases for its use. Although some may argue that with 
maximum effort the 300-ship model is still able to respond with six CVBGs, it 
must be noted that this response would take significantly longer than the 
required time it took to get six CVBGs to Desert Shield/Storm in February 
1991. 
The smaller size of the amphibious forces under the 300-ship model will 
also have an adverse effect on the nation's ability to conduct forced entry 
missions. It is unlikely that the Navy/Marine Corps team could even get one 
division lifted to conduct forced entry missions. Even if one MEF was lifted, 
it is too small to conduct forced entry missions even at the low end of the 
operational level of warfare. 
The tactical level of warfare is fought at the division level or below. The 
MEF would be an ideal size unit at this level, but the time and resources that 
it would take to collect and deploy such a force rules it out for rapid response. 
A MEB could be lifted to the crisis although a lot of difficulty would be 
encountered. It would require all the forward deployed amphibious ships of 
both fleets and some non-deployed forces to be committed to the crisis. Thus 
one fleet would have no ARG forward deployed. Although it would take 
time to get it there, a MEB should be able to handle some crises that occur at 
the tactical level, or seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base, or 
coastal air base to allow the entry of heavier Army or Air Force forces. 
The MEU that is kept forward deployed in each fleet is best suited to 
conducting missions, such as, non-combatant evacuation operations, 
amphibious raids, a presence force or a force enabler for heavier follow on 
forces. Due to its small size and lack of heavy armor, the employment of a 
MEU for the purpose of establishing a force on a hostile shore should be 
viewed with caution. The MEU can operate only at the low end of the tactical 
level of warfare. 
Therefore, the 300-ship model would limit future amphibious operations 
to "Grenada" size operations. Even this size of operation would require 
longer planning/slower response time due to the smaller number of forward 
deployed amphibious ships. 
Under the 300-ship model, the nation's ability to respond unilaterally, at 
the operational level of warfare, when American interests are threatened is 
questionable. Unlike the Reagan Administration's proposed 600-ship navy, 
the United States would only be able to project power conventionally at the 
tactical level of warfare. Therefore, the United States would be forced to rely 
more heavily on joint and coalition warfare to accomplish its objectives. 
The 300-ship model navy's ability to fulfill the Bush Administration's 
goal of handling one and one-half crises simultaneously is uncertain. Due to 
its reduced force structure, the 300-ship model's response time would be 
slower than what the Navy has traditionally been able to accomplish. This 
goal might be accomplished if the second crisis (i.e., the "one-half" crisis) was 
an LRC and if the Army, Air Force, and Navy were split among the crises. 
Successful future crisis response will rely heavily on joint/coalition 
operations using a mix of active and selective reserve units. 
Recons ti tution 
A fundamental concept in the Bush Administration's new strategy is that 
there will be sufficient warning prior to a global war to allow the United 
States to reconstitute its forces in adequate time to counter the threat of any 
REGT. Reconstitution is the generation of new forces to meet contingencies 
that require forces beyond those available from active and reserve 
components. Implicit in this concept is the assumption that any military 
threat beyond a regional crisis will also have to be built or reconstituted. 
Although the Bush Administration's Base Force comes closer than the 
300-ship model, neither are capable of meeting the requirements needed to 
fulfill the Navy's reconstitution roles. This is primarily due to the fact that 
the Navy can not afford to fulfill these roles either the Bush Administration's 
)r 
proposed defense budget or the assumed "50 percent decrease" budget. 
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Additionally, it is unrealistic to think that the normally near sighted U.S. 
political process will respond to an emerging threat eight years prior to a 
potential conflict. Therefore, even if the United States could afford to 
maintain the ability to reconstitute its forces it is doubtful that we would start 
to respond to a potential adversary until a potential conflict was imminent. 
There are several implications for the United States of not being able to 
fulfill all of the Navy's reconstitution roles. First, the nation will not be able 
to maintain a credible naval shipbuilding capability. This could eventually 
result in the U.S. Navy losing its naval superiority since its ability to build 
more than a few ships a year in the 2lst would be questionable. This would 
mean the cost for a potential adversary of building a credible naval force 
would be significantly less and could cause the emergence of a competing d 
naval powers. 
1 
Additionally, the nation's "defensive shield" behind which it could 
reconstitute its forces in time of war would have to rely heavily on its 
strategic nuclear forces. The small number of new equipment that could be 
afforded under both the Bush Administration's proposed defense budget and 
the "50 percent decrease" budget could eventually result in a military that 
could no longer credibly hold off any large scale conventional attack against 
the U.S. or its allies by the use of conventional forces alone. 
The United States can probably afford to leave the Bush Administration's 
new strategy's reconstitution pillar unfulfilled and instead rely on the 
nation's strategic nuclear forces to deter any REGT from attempting to attack 
the United States directly or start a global war. Since the United States and 
NATO successfully relied on their strategic nuclear forces to deter a European- 
centered global war during the Cold War it seems logical that American 
strategic nuclear forces can also deter any potential REGT during the post- 
Cold War era. 
The Navy's Future Course 
Major changes in our national policy have occurred in the last three 
years. This has changed the required roles and missions the Navy must 
fulfill. The Navy must recognize these changes and plan accordingly. A 
consensus of opinion, based on merit, must be reached by the Navy's 
leadership about what course the Navy will steer in the future. Additional 
defense budget cuts are going to occur, and if the Navy continues to use 
bureaucratic compromise to make force structure decisions it will find itself 
drifting aimlessly into the next century. 
National missions that require a navy must be determined. From these 
national missions the Navy's force structure (i.e., total number of each 
category of ship) must be determined. This should include a study of various 
alternative force structures. Then the specific type of ships can be determined. 
Although lessons from the past should be remembered, now is the time for 
the Navy to consider how to best fulfill roles and missions in the future. 
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